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Missouri Law Review
Volume XI NOVEMBER, 1946 Number 4
THE WORK OF THE MISSOURI SUPREME COURT
FOR THE YEAR 1945
STATISTICAL SURVEY
JAMES E. CRAIo*
During the year 1945, the judges and commissioners of the Missouri
Supreme Court wrote a total of 197 separate majority opinions. Of this
number, three which were originally written as divisional opinions were
later accepted as the opinion of the court en banc. In addition, there
were handed down, four dissenting opinions and two separate concurring
opinions. This total represents a considerable decrease from those of
recent years: 1940, 282; 1941, 336; 1942, 293; 1943, 306; 1944, 264.
The distribution of these opinions among the various members and
divisions of the court during 1945 is indicated by Table I.
TABLE I
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V an Osdol ............................................................................................ 21
W esthues ............................................................................................ 18
Subtotal ........................................................................................ 113
Per Curiam .......................................................................................... 2
T otal ............................................................................................ 197
NUMBER OF DISSENTING OPINIONS WRITTEN
Clark ........................................................................................................ 1
Ellison ...................................................................................................... 2
H yde ........................................................................................................ 1
T otal ................................................................................................ 4
NUMBER OF CONCURRING OPINIONS WRITTEN
H yde ........................................................................................................ 2
NUMBER OF OPINIONS WRITTEN BY EACH DIVISION
En B anc .............................................................................................. 29
D ivision N um ber One ........................................................................ 90
D ivision N um ber Tw o .....................................-................................ 78
T otal ............................................................................................ 197
Table II indicates the classification of the 197 cases handled by the
Missouri Supreme Court during the year 1945, as per their dominant issues.
The figures are of necessity only an approximation, since many of the cases
involved more than one outstanding issue and consequently had to be
classified arbitrarily to the extent of placing them in one category only.
TABLE II
TOPICAL ANALYSIS OF DECISIONS
A doption .....................................................-........................................ 1
A ppeal and Error .............................................................................. 5
A ttorney and Client .......................................................................... 1




Creditors R ights ............................................................................... 2
Crim inal Law .............. 35................................... .................................. 
D am ages ............................................................................................. 1
2
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Divorce -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1




Habeas Corpus ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1
Insurance -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 7
Judgments ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 4
M andamus ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 1
M aster and Servant ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1
M ortgages ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 3
M unicipal Corporations -------------------------------------------------------------------- 6
Negligence (Automobiles) -------------------------------------------------------------- 8
Other Negligence -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 15
Partnerships ------------------------------------------------------------ - - -- - -- - - -- - ---- - 1
Pleading ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 6
Practice and Procedure ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 9
Real Property ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 24
Statutes .............................................................................................. 6
Taxation ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 6
Torts (Other Than Negligence) ------------------------------------------------------ 4
Trusts -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 5
Unemployment Coripensation -------------------------------------------------------- 3
W ills and Administration ---------------------------------------------------------------- 5
Workmen's Compensation ---------------------------------------------------------------- 6
Total -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 197
Table III indicates the disposition made of the 197 cases handled by
the Missouri Supreme Court during 1945. It is possible that some of these
categories may be tautological due to the fact that the different judges




Alternative Writ of Mandamus Made Permanent ........................ 1
Alternative Writ of Mandamus Made Peremptory .................... 1
Appeal Dismissed - ..-----------------------.------ .....................------ ------ ------ -- 2
Decree Affirmed ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 6
- Decree Affirmed in Part, Reversed in Part, and Cause
Remanded with Directions ..................................................... 2
Decree Reversed, and Cause Remanded with Directions ............ 3
Immediate Absolute Rule in Prohibition Ordered,..: ... - 1
3
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Judgment Affirmed ............................................................................ 86
Judgment Affirmed, and Cause Remanded with Directions ........ 2
Judgment Affirmed upon Condition of Remittitur ...................... 2
Judgment Affirmed in Part, Reversed and Remanded in Part .... 2
Judgment Modified, and Affirmed as Modified ........................... 1
Judgment Reversed ......................................................................... 4
Judgment Reversed, and Cause Remanded ................................. 26
Judgment Reversed with Directions .............................................. 1
Judgment Reversed and Cause Remanded with Directions ........ 11
Judgment Reversed, and Cause Remanded with Directions,
Provided Plaintiff Enter a Remittitur ................................ 1
Judgment Reversed, and Cause Remanded for Retrial ............ 1
Judgment Reversed in Part, and Remanded for New Trial ........ 1
Judgment of Court of Appeals Quashed, and Judgment of
Trial Court Affirmed ................................................................ 1
Motion to Dismiss Appeal Sustained ........................................... 2
Opinion Quashed ................................................................................ 3
Opinion Quashed in Part ................................................................ 1
Opinion Quashed, Order Granting New Trial Affirmed, and
Cause Rem anded ........................................................................ 1
Order Affirm ed .................................................................................... I
Order Affirmed, and Cause Remanded ........................................... 1
Order of Dismissal Affirmed .......................................................... 1
Order Granting New Trial Affirmed .............................................. 1
Order Granting New Trial Affirmed, and Cause Remanded
with D irections .......................................................................... 1
Order Granting New Trial Set Aside, and Cause Remanded
w ith D irections .......................................................................... 1
Order Remanding Petitioner to Custody of Warden .................. 2
Order Reversed ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1
Order Reversed, and Cause Remanded with Directions ............ 1
Peremptory Writ of Mandamus Denied ........................................ 1
Peremptory Writ of Mandamus Issued ...................................... 3
Preliminary Rule in Prohibition Discharged ................................ 1
Preliminary Writ of Prohibition Quashed .................................... 1
Provisional Rule in Prohibition Made Absolute ............................ 1
Provisional Rule in Prohibition Quashed ...................................... 1
Record Quashed .................................................................................. 1
Record Quashed in Part, and Judgment of Trial Court Reversed
and Rem anded ............................................................................ 1
Respondent's Record Quashed in Part .......................................... 1
Rule in Prohibition Made Absolute in Part, and Otherwise
D ischarged .................................................................................. 1
Transferred to Court of Appeals ................................................... 7
[Vol. 11
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Writ of Certiorari Quashed ------------------------------------------------------------ 2
Writ of Error Dismissed ---------------------------------------------------------------- 1
Writ of Habeas Corpus Quashed, and Petitioner Remanded
to Custody of Warden ---------------------------------------------------------------- 2
Writ of Mandamus Denied in Part, and Made Peremptory in
Part ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1
Total -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 197
Table IV indicates the disposition of those motions subsequent to
decision for the determination of which records are now available. Those
cases in which rehearings were granted, or which were transferred to the
court en banc upon proper motion, represent the main categories which
cannot be listed for this reason. Present records show one case which
was taken to the United States Supreme Court upon a writ of certiorari.
TABLE IV
MISCELLANEOUS
Motion for Rehearing Denied ---------------------------------------------------- 81
Motion to Transfer to Court En Banc Denied -------------------------- 14
Motion to Modify Denied ---------------------------------------------------------------- 3




THE JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT
The opinions written during the year 1945 afford evidence of the fact
that jurisdictional questions are becoming less frequent. During the year
under review the court found it necessary to transfer only six cases to the
courts of appeal.
In Daugherty v. City of Monett,' a workmen's compensation case, the
appeal was from a total award of $5,086.00 and $6.34 per week thereafter
for the remainder of the claimant's life. Because the jurisdictional amount
was contingent, the court held that it was without appellate jurisdiction
*Attorney, Kansas City, LL.B., Kansas City School of Law, 1912.
1. 188 S. W. (2d) 10 (Mo. 1945).
5
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and transferred the case to the court of appeals. In so doing, the court
again calls attention to a decision written in 1937 in the case of Hardt v.
City Ice & Fuel Company2 and other previous decisions. The Hardt case
had exhaustively considered the question, and, as pointed out in the review
of that decision in the Missouri Law Review,3 earlier decisions were over-
ruled by Division One of the court and that ruling was followed by Divi-
sion Two. The question, therefore, may now be considered settled. It is
only in those cases where the commission has commuted the award, and the
amount commuted is in excess of $7,500.00, that the jurisdictional amount
affirmatively appears from the record.
In Fanchom & Marco Enterprises v. Dysart,4 a suit for specific per-
formance of an option contract for the purchase of corporate stock, the
case was transferred to the court of appeals because the record did not
affirmatively show that the amount in money actually in dispute is in
excess of $7,500.00; and in Bostian v. Milens,5 where the action involved
the right of the trustee in bankruptcy to an interest in the assets of an
estate being administered by the probate court, the failure of the record to
show the total amount of the expenses of administration of the probate
estate and the claims allowed left the record indefinite as to the amount
involved, resulting in transfer of the appeal to the court of appeals. In that
case the court also declined to exercise jurisdiction under the constitu-
tional provision conferring jurisdiction upon the supreme court in cases
involving the validity of a treaty or statute of the United States or any
authority exercised under the laws of the United States, notwithstanding
the fact that it was contended that a decision of the federal court between
the same parties was drawn in question in the instant case. The court
ruled that "it would seem that a question of the effect (italics added) of
the decision of the circuit court of appeals, in so far as the question bears
upon the appellate jurisdiction of this court, is quite analagous to a ques-
tion of the 'interpretation and application' of the terms of the federal
statute. It is held that the interpretation and application of the terms of
the federal statute whose validity is not drawn in question are not within
the intendment of the constitutional provision vesting appellate jurisdiction
in this court."
2. 340 Mo. 721, 102 S. W. (2d) 592 (1937).
3. (1938) 3 Mo. L. REv. 348, 349, 350.
4. 189 S. W. (2d) 291 (Mo. 1945).
5. 188 S. W. (2d) 945 (Mo. 1945).
(Vol. 11
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In Buddon Realty Company v. Wallace,' where the appeal was from
a judgment of dismissal after a hearing on the merits in an equity case
where the petition had asked for a money judgment of over $66,000.00,
the court, upon an examination of the entire record, found that the juris-
dictional amount was not, in fact, involved and that the claim that the
amount in dispute exceeded the sum of $7,500.00 was merely colorable.
Th court states that it will not "'give to a plaintiff the whimsical and
unregulated power to control its jurisdiction by a mere stroke of his pen
in his petition.' . . ." In transferring the case to the court of appeals the
court emphasizes the fact that, with the evidence before it, the mere allega-
tions of the petition do not satisfy jurisdictional requirements. That, of
course, would not be true if the appeal had been from an adverse result
reached upon sustaining a demurrer to the petition.
In Keen v. City of St. Louis,7 an action for negligence in the operation
of a public market, where the city does not own, control, and operate the
market as a political subdivision of the state, but only in a proprietary
capacity, the case was transferred to the court of appeals because it was
not an action to which the state or one of its political subdivisions was
a party in the constitutional sense. So, also, in State ex rel Office of Civilian
Defense Salvage Committee v. Horner" the court held that an action by the
State of Missouri on the relation of the 0 ce of Civilian Defense Salvage
Committee to enjoin disbursement of money received in the sale of scrap col-
lected in the war effort was not an action in which a state officer was a
party so as to give the supreme court jurisdiction where the members
of the State Council of Defense were not named as parties, and that if
the Salvage Committee of the State Council of Defense was intended to
be joined as relator the members of the committee so intended did not
constitute the State Council of Defense created by the governor. In trans-
ferring that case to the court of appeals the court carefully called attention
to the fact that it was controlled by the old constitution and stated "We
do not imply that this court would or would not have jurisdiction of the
case at bar were the proposed Constitution now effective."
In McMurray v. Kansas City Gas Company9 two personal injury
actions, one by a husband and the other by his wife, ,were currently pend-
6. 188 S. W. (2d) 28 (Mo.' 1945).
7. 185 S. W. (2d) 23 (Mo. 1945).
8. 184 S. W. (2d) 1002 (Mo. 1945).,
9. 186 S. W. (2d) 593 (Mo. 1945). "
7
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ing in the circuit court. The wife's case was tried to a jury in Division One
of the circuit court but the records of the assignment division show that
only the husband's case had been assigned to that division for trial. A
motion was filed to correct the assignment division's record to show that
the wife's case had been assigned out for trial and not the husband's.
The appeal was from an order sustaining that motion. The court held (a)
that the order appealed from was not an appealable order; and (b) that,
even if such an appeal would lie, the case was not one where the supreme
court would have jurisdiction. Notwithstanding that fact, the court dis-
missed the appeal rather than transfer the case to the court of appeals,
holding "We can see no reason why the dismissal of the present appeal
should be delayed; we know of no reason why the order of dismissal cannot
be made here. Such will be in the interest of speedier justice." It is to
be noted that a similar situation had arisen in the case of Cox v. Schaab
Stove and Furniture Company1° and that the court, in the Cox case, trans-
ferred the appeal to the court of appeals where an order of dismissal of
appeal was finally entered. The court in the McMurray case expressly
overruled the Cox case. While it is true that the modern tendency of courts
is in the interest of speedy administration of justice, the McMurray deci-
sion seems to overlook the fact that the jurisdiction of the supreme court
is defined by the constitution and, where jurisdiction is lacking, the power
to decide that an appeal is premature or from an unappealable order
is also lacking. If the supreme court can act for the court of appeals in
a case where the action taken is the only action that could be taken, then
it can act for the court of appeals in a case where the course of action to
be taken is not so clearly defined. Jurisdiction to decide a question includes
the jurisdiction to decide it incorrectly. If jurisdiction is lacking, the deci-
sion is void. And, since the jurisdiction of the supreme court is defined by
the constitution, and that jurisdiction did not include the right to deter-
mine whether or not the appeal in the McMtrray case was from an appeal-
able order, the result reached by the decision may well be qcestioned.
In Garrisbn v. Garrison l the trustees of a trust created by will prose-
cuted an appeal from a decree in equity determining the right to testa-
mentary trust income. A motion to dismiss the appeal was filed on the
theory that trustes are not "aggrieved," within the meaning of the statute
10. 332 Mo. 492; 58 S. W. (2d) 700 (1933).
11. 188 S. W. (2d) 644 (Mo. 1945).
8
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authorizing appeals, by a judgment determining the rights of the benefi-
ciaries because they have no sufficient interest for the prosecution of the
appeal. The court, however, reviews many authorities which, while recog-
nizing that rule, also recognize the possibility of exceptions to it. Because
the record shows that the trustees in the case under consideration repre-
sented the interests of unborn heirs, the court held that such trustees are
"aggrieved" and that they were made parties to bring the interests of
unborn heirs into court and make the judgment binding upon them; hence
the trustees had the right of appeal.
In Wanstrat v. Kapel'2 the appeal was from an order striking appell-
ant's answer and cross bill and dismissing him as a party defendant in an
action to set aside a trust and establish property rights. It was contended
that his appeal should be dismissed because the action of the trial court in
striking his cross bill did not finally determine all issues as to all parties,
but the court overruled the motion to dismiss the appeal, holding that the
cross bill purports to set up a new cause of action, not against plaintiff
but against appellant's co-defendants, and that, if the cross bill was a
proper pleading, the order striking it from the files was a final appealable
judgment. On the merits, however, the court reached the conclusion that
the cross bill was not a proper pleading and affirmed the action of the trial
court in dismissing it. The case arose prior to, and was not governed by,
the provisions of the new code of civil procedure. The opinion, therefore,
is of historical interest only, the court pointing out that "the new code
has changed the law as to counterclaims and cross bills, has empowered the
chancellor to order separate trials, and permits an appeal from a judgment
on a separate trial without waiting for all issues to be tried, but those
provisions are not applicable here."
THE EFFECT OF DECISIONS
When the case of Laughlin v. Boatmen's National Bank of St. Louis13
was first before the court, the judgment on the second and third counts
of plaintiff's petition was affirmed and the judgment on count one was
reversed and remanded. At the second trial, which was confined to count
one, the trial court took the position that the affirmance of the judgment
as to counts two and three was res adjudicata of the issue of fraud and
12. 190 S. W. (2d) 241 (Mo. 1945).
13. 163 S. W. (2d) 761 (Mo. 1945).
9
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conspiracy which defense had been pleaded to all three counts. On the
second appeal14 the court ruled that its former opinion did not specifically
remand the cause for a retrial of a single issue, but for retrial of all issues
presented on count one of the petition. Accordingly it was held that the
former opinion was not res adjudicata of the issue of fraud and conspiracy
because the remand was generally for a new trial and where a case is
remanded generally all issues are open to consideration on a new trial.
The opinion, therefore, directs that upon a retrial of count one, for the
third time, "all issues as to that count are to be tried anew without reserva-
tion or restriction as though the cause had never been tried before."
REcoRDs AND BRIEFS
In Nelson v. Hammett" the action was one in equity to set aside a
deed and defendant appealed from an order granting plaintiff a new trial.
The appeal was lodged in the supreme court before the new civil code
went into effect but the abstract and briefs were filed after the new code
became effective. Appellant's abstracts of the record did not contain any
evidence but, in lieu thereof, set out two letters of the trial judge purport-
ing to give his reasons for his findings. The court declined to consider these
letters as a part of the record and dismissed the appeal because, without
the evidence before it, the abstract was insufficient either under the rules
in force prior to the new civil code, or under that code and the court rules
adopted pursuant thereto. But, in Shepard v. Shepard,'0 another equity
case where not all of the evidence was brought up in the record, the court
declined to dismiss the appeal on the ground of insufficiency of the record,
holding that the evidence presented was sufficient for a complete under-
standing of the case.
One of the purposes of the new code of civil procedure, and the supreme
court rules promulgated pursuant thereto, is to provide a method for shor-
tening the record on appeal. But, as pointed out in State ex rel National
Outdoor Advertising Company v. Seehorn,17 abbreviated records cannot
be forced upon the parties but can be presented only by consent of the
parties to the suit. While it is true that the trial court has the right to re-
quire such additions to an agreed statement as may be necessary to present
14. 189 S. W. (2d) 974 (Mo. 1945).
15. 189 S. W. (2d) 238 (Mo. 1945).
16. 186 S. W. (2d) 472 (Mo. 1945).
17. 188 S. W. (2d) 657 (Mo. 1945).
10
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the questions raised by appeal, that power of supervision cannot be con-
strued as power in the trial court to compel a party to consent to an abbrevi-
ated record.
The court found it necessary, during the year under review, to dis-
miss only one appeal for failure to comply with the rules of court with
respect to the contents of the briefs. In that case, Walker v. Allebac4'8
the court, after several attempts to aid the appellant by extensions of time
and ignoring deficiencies in the record, was presented with a brief contain-
ing no jurisdictional statement, only partially stating the facts, making
no page references to the transcript, containing no specifications of error
or points and authorities, and embracing an argument consisting only of
abstracts of propositions of law and excerpts from decided cases without
showing their applicability to the case at bar. The court was thus left
without sufficient information on which to proceed. But, in State v.. Brink-
ley," the court refused to dismiss the appeal in a criminal case for violation
of the rule with respect to briefs because of the duty of the court under
the statute to review the record and render judgment thereon even if the
appellant had filed no brief.
Many of the cases decided during the year under review reached the
court before the new code of civil procedure and the new rules adopted
by the court pursuant thereto became effective, but the year's decisions
do not indicate that the adoption of these improvements in court procedure
has created conditions of uncertainty. In fact, interpretative decisions of
the new code and the new rules have not yet appeared in great numbers.
EVIDENCE
JACKSON A. WRIGHT*
The decisions of the Supreme Court of Missouri during 1945 on evidence
law were, for the most part, based on well established rules, and laws of
evidence set forth in previous years. In this summary, it is the purpose of
the writer to touch only on points which might be considered interesting to
the readers.
18. 189 S. W. (2d) 282 (Mo. 1945).
19. 189 S. W. (2d) 314 (Mo. 1945).
*Attorney, Mexico. B.S. 1940, LLB. 1944, University of" Missouri.
11
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JUDICIAL NOTICE
In Salvation Army v. Hoeln,1 the court held that it would take judicial
notice of the fact that the YMCA and YWCA were benevolent, religious and
educational institutions. It held, however, in State ex rel. Inter-state Oil
Company v. Bland2 that it was not authorized to take judicial notice of the
fact that dermatitis was an occupational disease, within the provisions of
a Workmen's Compensation and employer's liability policy excluding occu-
pational disease.3
RELEVANCY, MATERIALITY AND COMPETENCY
(a) Inferences
H brought a declaratory judgment action to determine the interest in
life insurance policies on the life of H, which policies named W as beneficiary.
W contended that the policies were an executed gift from H, her estranged
husband. The court held that when W testified that H's sister and brother-
in-law, who lived with H, wrote to her that H had authorized delivery of
policies to her, and that she later received them through the mail, the failure
of the sister and brother-in-law to testify would warrant an inference that,
if her testimony were false, they would have denied it.
4
In Cooper v. Standard Steel Works,5 there was testimony by the plain-
tiff on cross-examination that he was in charge of the truck in which he
was riding at the time of the collision with a passenger car, and that he
"guessed" he could have ordered the truck driver to stop. The court held
that this testimony was sufficient to require an instruction that if the jury
found that he had authority to control the movement of the truck, he was
required to exercise the highest degree of care. The use of the word "guess"
did not necessarily make the statement a legal conclusion and this statement,
taken with other evidence, could be considered by the jury. This statement
was the only evidence of direct control over the movement and operation
of the truck, and the court states that the jury could find that such control
existed, thus making the negligence, if any, of the driver of the truck im-
putable to the plaintiff.
1. 188 S. W. (2d) 826 (Mo. 1945).
2. 190 S. W. (2d) 227 (Mo. 1945).
3. The court relied, for this, on Smith v. Harbison-Walker Refractories Com-
pany, 340 Mo. 389, 100 S. W. (2d) 909 (1936).
4. State ex rel. Smith v. Bland, 186 S. W. (2d) 443 (1945).
5. 190 S. W. (2d) 237 (Mo. 1945).
12
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WITNESSES
In the cases of Stevens v. Kansas City Gas Company and Stevens V.
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company,6 the court followed the usual rule
that the qualification of expert witnesses is in the discretion of the trial
court, and is not reversible unless there is an abuse of such discretion. The
court reiterates that ordinarily witnesses must state facts from which jurors
are to form their own opinions, but where specialized questions are involved,
so that the jury cannot judge from the facts, persons, who by experience,
observation or knowledge are peculiarly qualified to draw conclusions from
the facts, may be permitted to give their opinion with regard to such facts,
for the purpose of aiding the jury. The opinion is only to aid the jury, how-
ever, and not binding thereon.
In Smite v. Fitzjohn,7 the court likewise upheld the rule that the testi-
mony of a lay witness is competent as to sanity, where such testimony is the
opinion of the witness based on facts furnishing a reasonable inference of
mental unsoundness. However, such testimony is not competent when the
facts involved show that the testatrix thought that someone was trying
to get her money, and keeping watch on her, and that these fears of the
testatrix were well founded.
IMPEACHMENT
State v. Fleming8 was a criminal action against the defendant for stat-
utory rape. The trial court allowed prior statements of the prosecutrix to
be introduced in evidence over objections. It was contended by the State
on appeal that such statements were admissible to establish credibility of
the prosecutrix. No prior inconsistent statements were introduced into evi-
dence, though the prosecutrix was questioned with regard to prior incon-
sistent statements on cross-examination. The court holds that mere cross-
examination is insufficient to render the witness's prior extrajudicial state-
ments consistent with her testimony admissible, and even where impeached,
that only prior consistent statements bearing directly upon and rebutting
the inconsistent statements are admissible, and not statements relating to
her entire testimony."
6. 191 S. W. (2d) 601 (Mo. 1946).
7. 188 S. W. (2d) 832 (Mo. 1945).
8. 188 S. W. (2d) 12 (Mo. 1945).
9. Note (1942) 140 A. L. R. 21, 164.
13
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ADMISSIONS
In Dodd v. Missouri, Kansas and Texas Railroad Company,' the action
was for the death of a railway signal maintainer operating a motor car which
was struck in the rear by a freight train. The court held that the plaintiff
was not bound by testimony of the engineer, who was called as plaintiff's
witness, that he was unable to stop the train or slacken the speed in time
to avoid the collision. The court held that the jury could believe testimony
of two former railroad engineers, who were called as expert witnesses by the
plaintiff, that the train could have been stopped or its speed slackened to
that of the motor car in order to avoid the collision.
HEARSAY
The most interesting decisions handed down in 1945 were with regard
to hearsay evidence, and exceptions to the hearsay rule. In the case of
Lavender v. Kurn,11 the question was presented upon appeal as to the suf-
ficiency of the evidence to make a submissible case. The supreme court
held that the determination of the question depended upon the admissibility
and competency of testimony of one Drashman that, "He examined the
fireman's side of the train more carefully than the engineer's side, and did
so because he was told by an Illinois Central switchman that Haney 'was
supposed to have been struck by something protruding on the side of the
train.'" The plaintiff contended that the evidence was competent under the
res gestae rule. The court does not consider in its opinion the question as
to whether or not the evidence was admissible to show the state of mind
of the witness. It would seem to the writer that the evidence was competent
for this purpose, since, to show the state of mind, the facts stated need not
necessarily be true. However, even if admissible for this purpose, it could
not be taken or considered as being competent for the purpose of making
a submissible case. The court held that the evidence, to make a submissible
case, must be taken as true, and as to this, it is a statement based on hearsay
(i.e. hearsay on hearsay). Res gestae is a statement made by "a person
involved in or present at an accident," said statement being testified to by
one to whom the statement was made at a time sufficiently close to the
occurrence of the accident to make it unlikely that the speaker would be
speaking an untruth. The court held that the testimony in the principal
10. 184 S. NV. (2d) 4546 (Mo. 1945).
11. 189 S. W. (2d) 253 (Mo. 1945).
[Vol. 11
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case is not such a statement, since the statement made to the witness was
only a statement of what another person had told the speaker. The case
was reversed in the Supreme Court of the United States, but that Court
refused to decide the question of the admissibility of the above evidence.' 2
In Sutter v. Easterly," another hearsay question was presented. This
was a suit in equity to set aside a judgment for damages and to restrain
collection of the judgment, the plaintiff alleging that a principal witness for
the plaintiff in the damage suit had sworn falsely. In the equity suit, the
witness refused to testify on the ground that his testimony might incrim-
inate him. An affidavit was then introduced over the objection of the de-
fendant, in which the witness had admitted that the testimony in the damage
suit was fabricated. The defendant alleged, on appeal, that this affidavit
was not admissible, since it was hearsay. The plaintiff contended that it
was admissible, as a declaration against interest. The court held that it was
a declaration against interest, and that it could be used. The argument that
the witness was not dead and was present in court, was held by the court
to not be decisive. The witness was just as unavailable as if he were dead.
The court then makes the interesting observation that to further sustain
the fact that the declaration was against interest, and that it was not a
coerced declaration, or fraudulent, was that the witness did not testify con-
trary to the affidavit even though he was present.
The court further refused to pass on the question of the necessity of
a pecuniary or proprietary interest of the witness in considering a declaration
against interest. The court said that the exception to the hearsay rule is
based on circumstances which make it unliekly to be deliberately false or
heedlessly incorrect, even though not subject to cross-examination. They
further overruled the contention that the English rule that a declaration
against interest cannot be used when it would constitute an admission that
the declarent had committed a crime, does not hold true in this state.
In DeMoulin v.. Roetheli, 4 there was evidence presented that the man-
ager of a grocery store, in helping the plaintiff arise after he had fallen on
the floor in the grocery store, stated something about grease being on the
floor the day before, and was not removed because of neglectfulness. The
court held that this was admissible, and that the exact words of the manager
12. Lavender v. Kum, 66 Sup. Ct 740 (U. S. 1946).
13. 189 S. NV. (2d) 284 (Mo. 1945).
14. 189 S. W. (2d) 562 (Mo. 1945).
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need not be used. They further held that it would justify an inference that
the grease was on the floor the day before, and, when no objection was made
to its admission, could be given full probative force.
In Waterous v. Columbian National Life Insurance Company,15 the
court held that a medical report by the defendant's physician was not ad-
missible in evidence, where the physician was in court as a witness. It was
held that the medical report did not come under the rule that declarations
made in the course of business at or about the time the fact or facts stated
occurred, by third persons who are unavilable as witnesses, are admissible in
evidence.
THE HUMANITARIAN DOCTRINE
WILLIAM H. BECKER, JR.*
For the years 1943 to 1945, both inclusive, the decisions of the supreme
court did not contain any radical examination of the bases of the humani-
tarian doctrine. During those years no case arose provoking any serious
difference of opinion among the judges or commissioners. Only one humani-
tarian case was decided by the court, en bane.
The availability of the humanitarian doctrine in actions under the Fed-
eral Employers Liability Act, was affirmed in Mooney v. Terminal R. Ass'n.
of St. Louis.1
Most of the cases involved familiar fact situations and the propriety of
instructions. The use of various forms of defensive instructions, embodying
the theory that the negligence of the plaintiff or of a third party was the
sole cause of plaintiff's injury, continued to provide one of the principal
sources of assignment of error upon appeal. Generally the court seemed to
be endeavoring to administer the doctrine as one based upon fault, but in at
least one case it seemed extremely questionable whether the alleged negli-
gence of the defendant was in any way responsible for the injury for which
damage was sought.2
15. 186 S. W. (2d) 456 (Mo. 1945).
*Attorney, Columbia. LLB., University of Missouri, 1932.
1. 352 Mo. 245, 176 S. W. (2d) 605, cert. denied 326 U. S. 723, 90 L. ed. 37(1944), noted in (1944) 9 Mo. L. REv.'264.
2. Hutchison v. Thompson, 175 S. W. (2d) 903 (Mo. 1943).
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The court rendered a decision with considerable practical interest to
practitioners in Teague v. Plaza Express Company.3 The court held unequivo-
cally that it was in error to give, at the request of a defendant in a humani-
tarian case, an instruction commenting upon the duty of a defendant when
confronted by a "sudden emergency" not caused by the defendant's fault.
I. THE COURT En Banc
State ex rel Kansas City Public Service Company v. Bland,4 involved
the striking of an automobile stalled upon the tracks, by defendant's street-
car. An instruction, defining imminent peril as follows, was condemned:
"The court instructs the jury that the term, 'imminent peril'
does not mean remote, uncertain, contingent danger nor, so far as
the plaintiff is concerned, avoidable danger, but means danger that
is immediately impending and- that admits of no time for delibera-
tion on the part of the person in peril between its appearance and
the impending calamity."
In a thoughtful, brief opinion, Judge Ellison pointed out that the itali-
cized portion of the instruction would deny recovery to the plaintiff where
plaintiff recklessly continued to expose himself to danger which was both
known to the plaintiff and avoidable. Further, it was held that the instruc-
tion invited counsel to argue contributory negligence of the plaintiff as a
defense to the humanitarian negligence.
In this case the court frankly recognized that "the whole humanitarian
doctrine is case law." In his opinion Judge Ellison called attention to the
fact that the court has never ruled that the injured party could not collect
damages under the humanitarian doctrine even for self sought injury or
suicide.
Enough is said in this case to constitute an implied, if not express,
reversal of the ruling in Johnson v. Hurck Delivery Service, Inc.,5 approv-
ing a similar instruction. Here an instruction approved by Division Number
1 in April, is held to be erroneous by the court, en banc the following Decem-
ber. Such a situation is not unusual in the administration of the humani-
tarian doctrine, and illustrates the difficulty with which practitioners are
confronted in the trial of cases under the doctrine.
3. 109 S. W. (2d) 254 (Mo. 1945).
4. 191 S. W. (2d) 660 (Mo. 1945).
5. 353 Mo. 1207, 187 S. W. (2d) 200 (1945).
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II. DIvIsIoN NUMBER I
Hutchison v. Thompsone was an action growing out of an automobile-
train crossing collision. In this case the automobile was held to have first
come into imminent peril one and three-fourths to two and one-half seconds
from the time it passed into the path of the overhang of the train. Under
such circumstances, it was held that the plaintiff made a submissable human-
itarian case upon failure to give emergency warning. It is extremely doubt-
ful whether an emergency warning, under the circumstances, could possibly
have prevented the collision. Within one and three-fourths to two and one-
half seconds, the following must have occurred in order to prevent plain-
tiff's injury:
(1) The fireman must have seen the automobile approaching the path
of the train and realized that the occupants were oblivious of danger and
intent upon proceeding into the path of the train;
(2) -The fireman must have determined to sound an emergency signal;
(3) The fireman must have sounded the signal in which act reaction time
would be a factor;
(4) The sound must have travelled to the ears of the driver of the car;
(5) The driver must have appreciated his peril and decided to stop;
(6) The car must have been brought to a stop before entering the path
of the overhang, in which act reaction time is again a factor.
In this connection it will be noted that the greatest liberality in the
submission of humanitarian cases occurs in cases submitted on failure to
warn. Cases such as the Hutchison case create the impression in some quar-
ters that the humanitarian doctrine, as administered, is not actually based
upon a finding of injury preventable by the failure to exercise care after the
situation of imminent peril arises. To say the least this case is extremely
close, especially when considered in the light of the phenomenon of reaction
time, now freely recognized by the court.
The companion case of Knorp v. Thompson,7 contains no additional
ruling of interest upon the humanitarian doctrine.
Robb v. St.. Louis Public Service Company," involved a streetcar-auto
collision prior to which both vehicles were traveling in the same direction.
The case is notable only for the sole cause instruction approved by the court.
6. 175 S. W. (2d) 903 (Mo. 1943) Supra note 2.
7. 352 Mo. 44, 175 S. W. (2d) 889 (1943).
8. 352 Mo. 566, 178 S. W. (2d) 443 (1944).
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Gosney v. May Lumber and Coal Company,9 involved an automobile-
truck collision at an intersection. The plaintiff relied upon the humanitarian
negligence in failing to stop, slacken or turn aside. The court held that no
submissable case was made because the evidence, viewed most favorably to
the plaintiff, showed that the vehicle in which plaintiff was riding suddenly
started and drove into the path of the defendant's vehicle so close thereto
that nothing could have been done to prevent the injury. It should be
noted in this connection that the plaintiff was not oblivious. It is generally
true that the more inattentive the plaintiff is the better his chances of
recovery are under the humanitarian doctrine.
Baker v. Kansas City Public Service Company,0 involved an automo-
bile-streetcar collision. The case was not remarkable except for the court's
comments and criticism, in refusing to hold in error a plaintiff's instruction
submitted as an antidote to defendant's sole cause defense.
Bootee v. Kansas City Public Service Company,- was a true humani-
tarian case, wherein an oblivious pedestrian was struck by a trolley bus
driven by an inattentive operator. The case was submitted under the human-
itarian rule upon failure to slacken and to swerve. A judgment for the de-
fendant was reversed by the supreme court because a sole cause instruction,
given at the instance the defendant, failed to negative defendant's negli-
gence or hypothesize facts which excluded negligence of the defendant. The
Bootee case is a good illustration of the pitfalls which may be encountered
in the drafting of a sole cause instruction under the humanitarian doctrine.
Shelton v. Thompson, 2 involved injury to a pedestrian by defendant's
train, occurring at night when pedestrian fell on defendant's tracks at a
lighted pedestrian crossing. The pedestrian had nearly crawled out of the
path of the train when the train ran over her foot. The supreme court held
that the pedestrian made a humanitarian case upon failure to slacken the
speed of the train; but that no case was made upon failure to stop. The
consideration of reaction time was a factor in the court's ruling that no
case was made upon failure to stop.
Scklemmer v. McGee, 3 involved a suit by a guest in a car which was
struck by an approaching truck while the host's car was making a "U"
9. 352 Mo. 693, 179 S. W. (2d) 51 (1944).
10. 353 Mo. 625, 183 S. W. (2d) 873 (1944).
11. 353 Mo. 716, 183 S. W. (2d) 892 (1944).
12. 353 Mo. 964, 185 S. W. (2d) 777 (1945).
13. 185 S. W. (2d) 803 (Mo. 1945).
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turn on the highway ahead of the truck. In this case the defendant suc-
cessfully maintained the defense that the sole cause of plaintiff's injury
was the negligence of plaintiff's host. Upon review the supreme court ap-
proved the sole cause instruction given on behalf of the defendant. This
case should be studied for an example for a sole cause instruction which
meets with the approval of the supreme court. This case further holds that
it is no longer a requirement of a sole cause instruction in a humanitarian
case brought by a guest, that the jury be cautioned that the host's negli-
gence is not imputable to the guest. The Schlemmer case should be con-
trasted with Bootee v. Kansas City Public Service Company.14
Johnson v. Hurck Delivery Service, Inc.," involved the striking of a
pedestrian who stepped into the street, in the path of an automobile, from
between parked automobiles. The supreme court, in this case, approved a
defendant's instruction submitting defendant's theory of the converse of
the humanitarian doctrine. It offers a form of instruction for the defend-
ant in cases where defendant contends that pedestrian suddenly steps into the
path of defendant's automobile.
In this case the court approved "Instruction No. 5," defining imminent
peril and containing a statement that imminent peril does not mean peril
"which is avoidable on the part of the plaintiff." Later in the same year
this holding of Division Number 1 was reversed in another case.' 0 Conse-
quently a practitioner should carefully avoid instructions containing the
language quoted above.
Lankford v. Thompson,". involved the striking of a pedestrian by de-
fendant's train at a pedestrian crossing. The case was submitted under the
humanitarian doctrine upon failure to warn. In this case the court approved
plaintiff's instruction on the humanitarian doctrine, containing a conclud-
ing sentence dealing with the effect of contributory negligence and making
due allowance for the defense that plaintiff's negligence was the sole cause of
plaintiff's injuries. The objection to the concluding part of the instruction
in the case of Smithers v. Barker,'8 was expressly obviated in this instruc-
tion. The case also contains a sole cause instruction and a plaintiff's instruc-
tion defining the limitations of the sole cause doctrine.
14. Supra note 11.
15. Supra note 5.
16. State ex rel. Kansas City Public Service Co. v. Bland, Supra note 4.
17. 189 S. W. (2d) 217 (Mo. 1945).
18. 341 Mo. 1017, 111 S. W. (2d) 47 (1937).
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Teague v. Plaza Express Company,19 (Companion case to the case of
White v. Teague,20 ) involved a trailer truck and passenger automobile colli-
sion at a highway intersection. It was submitted under the humanitarian
doctrine upon failure to warn, stop or slacken the speed of the truck. This
case is remarkable for its ruling, in disapproving the giving of an instruction
upon the duty of the defendant in a "sudden emergency" not caused by his
own fault. The court recognized the fact that in determining whether the
defendant is guilty of negligence, under the humanitarian doctrine, the occur-
rence of a "sudden emergency" is a factor to be considered in passing upon
the reasonableness of the defendant's choice of action. However, the court
found error in the giving of a "sudden emergency" instruction in connection
with a humanitarian instruction because of the injection of antecedent and
primary negligence into the case. Under this case a defendant's emer-
gency instruction has no place in a case submitted solely upon the humani-
tarian doctrine.
Johnson v. Terminal Railroad Association,21 involved an injury to plain-
tiff when the ladder upon which he was mounted, while working upon a pull-
man car, was struck by a train moving upon a parallel track. The casualty
occurred in the defendant's passenger car storage yard. The evidence was
reviewed and found to warrant the finding of a customary duty, on the part
of the defendant, to maintain a lookout for the plaintiff. The case is signifi-
cant for its holding, without dissent, that discoverable peril under the
humanitarian doctrine extends to those situations where the defendant is
under a continuing duty to keep a lookout, despite the fact that the defend-
ant had no employee so situated that he could have discovered plaintiff's
peril in time to have prevented injury. This would seem to indicate that,
at least in Division Number 1, the doctrine of Krause v. Pitcarn,22 will be
applied without further dissent, but one cannot be sure.
III. DiviSION NUMBER 2.
Bowman v. Standard Oil Company,2' involved a collision betwen auto-
mobiles at a highway interesection. Plaintiff was a guest in one of the auto-
mobiles. The plaintiff's host approached the highway intersection oblivious
19. Supra note 3.
20. 353 Mo. 247, 182 S. W. (2d) 288 (1944).
21. 191 S. W. (2d) 676 (Mo. 1945).
22. 350 Mo. 339, 167 S. W. (2d) 74 (1942).
23. 350 Mo. 958, 169 S. W. (2d) 384 (1943).
21
et al.: Work of the Missouri Supreme Court 1945
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1946
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
of the approach of defendant's vehicle. The defendant's driver was aware of
the intentions and obliviousness of plaintiff's host. The case is interesting
because of its approval of a concluding statement in plaintiff's humanitarian
instruction, directing a verdict regardless of plaintiff's conduct. In Smithers
v. Barker,2 4 a similar concluding paragraph was held error because of the
presence of the sole cause issue in the case. This case casts some doubt upon
the ruling of Smithers v. Barker. Judge Ellison concurred in result only.
The significance in this limited concurrence is not readily apparent. In any
event it appears to be the safer for the plaintiff to omit concluding para-
graphs of the type under review, where there is a sole-cause issue in the
case.
The Bowmarn v. Standard Oil Company2 case also holds that the sub-
mission of two grounds of humanitarian negligence in the conjunctive is
not error, though one ground is erroneously submitted. Also the case reaffirms
the rule that obliviousness need not be hypothesized in an instruction sub-
mitting humanitarian negligence and failure to warn.
Cameron v. Howerton,26 involved a truck-motorcycle collision at a
street intersection. The plaintiff saw the truck approaching some distance
away and assumed it would stop; thereafter the plaintiff was oblivious of
the movements of the truck. The operator of the truck saw, or should
have seen, plaintiff intent upon proceeding into the path of the truck.
Plaintiff was held to have made a submissable case. There was nothing
extraordinary about the ruling made. If the truck driver had sustained
injury and counterclaimed against the plaintiff, the court would have had
to settle the logical basis for the rule.
Smith v. Fine,27 involved the striking of a fifteen year old pedestrian,
crossing a street in the center of a block. Defendant's automobile, which
struck the child, changed its line of travel at an indefinite point somewhere
between the point of impact and a point one hundred thirty to one hundrd
forty feet away. When the progress of the defendant's car was last fixed by
the evidence, it was not proceeding so as to strike the plaintiff. Nevertheless
the court held that a humanitarian case was made, undertaking to dis-
tinguish the earlier case of Phillips v. Henson,28 reaching a contrary result.
24. Supra note 18.
25. Supra note 23.
26. 174 S. W. (2d) 206 (Mo. 1943).
27. 175 S. W. (2d) 761 (1943).
28. 326 Mo. 282, 30 S. W. (2d) 1065 (1930).
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This is a close case involving considerable suppositions concerning the sub-
jective intentions of the defendant to proceed along a changed line of
travel so as to inevitably strike plaintiff. The law on this situation cannot
be said to be settled until a similar case is determined by the court, en banc.
Mooney v. Termi l Railroad Assn. of St. Louis,29 is an interesting case.
It holds that humanitarian negligence is available in an action under the
Federal Employers Liability Act. It is another illustration of the operation
of the humanitarian doctrine in permitting an inattentive plaintiff to recover,
though recovery probably would have been denied had he been attentive.
Johnson v. Dawid off,30 is another case in which a pedestrian suddenly
stepped out into the street into the path of defendant's automobile. The
case was submitted under the humanitarian doctrine upon failure to swerve.
It is notable for two approved defense instructions, upon the principal
defenses available under the doctrine. One approved instruction was a sole
cause instruction. The other was a converse instruction submitting to the
jury defendant's theory that the plaintiff stepped into the view and path
of the defendant suddenly, and so shortly before the impact, that the de-
fendant could not avoid the collision. Results evident from the records of
the supreme court indicate that this type of instruction is proving to be
effective in influencing jury verdicts for the defendant.
Hendrick v. Kurn,31 involved a case wherein a pedestrian was found
mortally injured upon a railroad at a pedestrian crossing. There were no
eye witnesses and the trainmen denied ever seeing the deceased. The court
held that there was no direct evidence to make a humanitarian case, and
that the circumstantial evidence was insufficient. Although the circumstances
established to the satisfaction of the court, that the deceased was struck and
killed by defendant's train at a definite time, nevertheless, the court held
that there was not sufficient evidence to justify an inference that the de-
ceased was in imminent peril a sufficient length of time before he was struck
to permit the stopping of the train before the impact.
White v.. Teague.32 This case involved the same casualty involved in
Teague v. Plaza Express Company,3 3 decided by Division Number 1. The
action arose out of a collision between a passenger automobile and a trailer
29. Supra note 1.
30. 352 Mo. 343, 177 S. W. (2d) 467 (1944).
31. 352 Mo. 848, 179 S. W. (2d) 717 (1944).
32. Supra note 20.
33. Supra note 3.
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truck at a highway intersection. Plaintiff's wife was riding in an automo-
bile driven into the path of defendant's truck, by an oblivious and inatten-
tive operator. The driver of defendant's truck was aware of the approach
of the car in which plaintiff was riding and that the driver thereof was in-
attentive and determined to proceed into the intersection. Under such circum-
stances the court properly held that a humanitarian case was made.
Wilson v. Kurn,3 4 grew out of a collision between an automobile and a
backing railroad train, at a city street crossing on a misty night. The
plaintiff was held to have made a submissable case under the humanitarian
doctrine upon his testimony that he was stopped on the track in the path
of the train eight to ten seconds prior to the impact. Plaintiff's expert wit-
ness testified that the train could have been stopped in less than ten
seconds. Although plaintiff's estimation of the time was simply his best
judgment, this estimation, with the expert's testimony, was held to make a
case for the jury.
Pennington v. Weis,35 involved a truck-motorcycle collision at a street
intersection. As the two vehicles neared each other, the plaintiff motor-
cyclist saw the defendant's truck but was unable at that point to extricate
himself from danger. The driver of the truck, had he looked, could have
discovered plaintiff's peril, swerved to the left and avoided the collision.
The court held, in keeping with prior decisions, that obliviousness on the
part of the plaintiff is not necessary to create a situation of imminent peril,
and that the plaintiff may be in imminent peril without being oblivious,
if he is unable to extricate himself by his own efforts. In this case the
court approved plaintiff's instruction on the humanitarian doctrine, dis-
tinguishing it from an instruction condemned in Smitthers v. Barker.8'
Kimbroug. v. Chervitz,37 involved the striking of a pedestrian by an
automobile at a city street intersection. The case was submitted under
the humanitarian rule upon failure to slacken or swerve. The case is notable
for its approval of a defense instruction combining the sole cause concept
with elements of a defendant's converse instruction. In addition, the court
approved a defendant's instruction submitting the converse of plaintiff's
humanitarian instruction, on the theory that the plaintiff came into the
34. 183 S. W. (2d) 553 (1944).
35. 353 Mo. 750, 184 S. W. (2d) 416 (1944).
36. Supra note 18.
37. 353 Mo. 1154, 186 S. W. (2d) 461 (1945).
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view of the defendant suddenly and so shortly before the impact that
the defendant was unable to avoid the injury to the plaintiff.
Hensley v. Dorr,38 was an action by a guest riding in an automobile
against the host and driver for personal injuries growing out of a collision
between the automobile in which the plaintiff was riding and another
automobile upon a city street. The case was submitted upon primary negli-
gence and under the humanitarian doctrine upon failure to warn, to slacken
speed or to swerve. In that case it was held in error to give, on behalf of
the defendant, a converse instruction under the humanitarian doctrine be-
cause:
(1) The instruction did not clearly charge the defendant with the
duty of acting in the case of discoverable, as well as discovered peril, and
(2) The instruction ignored the issue of primary negligence.
In requesting a converse instruction upon 'the humanitarian rule in
a case submitted upon both primary and humanitarian negligence, careful
regard should be given to the holding of the court in the Hensley case.
INSURANCE
ORRIN B. EVANS*
The law of Missouri does not require that as a condition of engaging
in the life, health, and accident business, an insurance company must insure
all applicants against death or injury from any peril to which mortal man
might be subject. This means that the insurer who writes a life or accident
policy may except from the coverage of the policy specified risks, such as
death from poison or death incurred in air travel. On the other hand, if
he insures at all, the insurer cannot refuse to insure against death by
suicide, either by way of exception or otherwise. Since the decision in
Fields v. Pyramid Life Insurance Co.' it has been supposed that an excep-
tion broader than the risk of suicide-e.g., an exception of risk for death
from poisoning, whether administered by the insured or by a third person
-was not rendered nugatory simply because the expected hazard was
38. 191 S. W. (2d) 663 (Mo. 1945).
*Professor of Law, University of Missouri. B.A., University of Wisconsin,
1931; LL.B., 1935; J.S.D., Yale University, 1940.
1. 352 Mo. 141, 176 S. W. (2d) 281 (1944).
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realized through the insured's own act-e.g., intentionally self-administered
poison. In State ex rel. Kansas City Life Insurance co. v. Bland2 the double-
indemnity-for-accidental-death provision contained in the policy in the
suit excepted liability for death resulting directly or indirectly, wholly or
in part, "from poisoning, infection or any kind of illness, disease or infirmity."
The insured shot and killed himself while insane, an act which constitutes
accidental death in this state. The insurer's contention was that insanity
was a disease or infirmity of the mind and that the case fell within the
doctrine of the Fields decision. The court of appeals ruled against it and
on certiorari, the supreme court very reasonably observed that it had
never had occasion to interpret similar language for this purpose and that
a construction of the quoted clause in the policy that such language was
not intended to include self destruction while insane, did not conflict with
any prior decisions of the supreme court.
The main controversy was over language in the opinion below which
intimated that to sustain the insurer's contention would be to nullify the
two rules enforced in Missouri: (a) the statutory rule that the insurer may
not except death from suicide and (b) the judicial rule that death from
suicide is accidental. On its face, this appeared inconsistent with the ra-
tionale of the Fields opinion. The necessity of reconciliation was avoided,
however, by placing the decision in the instant case upon the fact that
the immediate and proximate cause of death-the gunshot wound-was
not excepted.
In Waterous v. Columbian National Life Insurance Co.,3 a suit upon
a policy insuring "against loss resulting from bodily injuries effected di-
rectly and independently of all other causes through accidental means ...
as hereinafter specified, subject to the provisions and limitations contained
herein . . .," which policy further provided that it did "not cover death
or injuries resulting from disease, infectious or otherwise . . .," the court
held that there was sufficient evidence to sustain the jury's findings that
the insured's paralysis resulted from an accidental blow on his head. The
court also held that the burden was on the defendant-insurer to establish
that the loss resulted from disease rather than from accidental injury. The
merit of such a rule would seem to depend on the nature of the limitation
of the insurer's responsibility. If the insurer contracts to pay for loss re-
2. 184 S. W. (2d) 425 (Mo. 1945).
3. 353 Mo. 1093, 186 S. NV. (2d) 456 (1945).
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sulting from accident "independent of all other causes" and the insured
makes out a prima facie case of loss from accidental injury, it may not be
unreasonable to require the insurer to carry the burden of proof that the
injury resulted from disease. On the other hand, if injury from disease
is clearly made an excepted risk it would seem essential that the insured
must establish to the satisfaction of the jury that his loss was within the
coverage of the policy. The court in this opinion does not discuss the
general merit of its rule, merely stating that it is established in this state
and that they are satisfied with it. Apart from considerations of logic,
the real question is whether in cases of this kind the insured or the insurer
is in the better position to supply evidence of the true facts.
Perhaps the most interesting holding in the decision is that to the
effect that evidence which might not be introduced to disprove the principal
claim, i.e., that the injury resulted from disease, because such evidence wag
hearsay, self serving, etc., could not be introduced for the purpose of show-
ing the good faith of the insurer in his refusal to pay, the issue being
damages for vexatious delay. Apparently, the insurer must not allow him-
self to be influenced in his decision to contest the action by any evidence
which he cannot introduce in court on the merit of the case.
In that "no man's land" of insurance law-the doctrine of waiver and
estoppel-one rule seems both well-established and applicable with fair
certainty. Where the act alleged to constitute the waiver or to raise the
estoppel was performed by the insurer's agent in conspiracy with the in-
sured, as part of a mutual plan to defraud the insurer, the insurer will not
be found to have waived his defense or be estopped to assert it. Neverthe-
less, the peculiar facts of State ex rel. Prudential Insurance Co. of Amnerica
v. Bland4 induced litigation which went all the way to the supreme court
on just this point. About two and a half years prior to the application
for the policy in suit, the insured's breast had been amputated because of
a lump diagnosed as cancer. About. seven months before the application,
she had been a hospital patient and received X-ray treatment for cancer.
The agent who took the application knew these facts, because the bene-
ficiary (the plaintiff in the instant case) had told him. At the time of the
application the agent executed an "agent's statement" in which he asserted
that he was unaware of anything about the insured's health history that
would render the risk undesirable and that she appeared in good health.
4. 190 S. W. (2d) 234 (Mo. 1945).
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There was no direct evidence that the applicant (the insured) knew that
the agent executed such a statement or that he knew of her medical history.
In making her application, the insured stated falsely that she had never
had a tumor or any disease of the breast, any serious illness or undergone
any surgical operation and that she had never been in a hospital for ob-
servation or treatment except a normal confinement. However, these state-
ments were made to the physician who took that part of the application
and it was not shown by direct evidence that the agent knew they had
been made, nor that the physician knew of their falsity. (There is no ex-
planation of why the physician, presumably making a physical examination,
did not acquire knowledge of the breast amputation.) Greater possibility
of inferentially tying together the guilty knowledge of the parties existed
because a second policy was issued approximately three weeks later upon
a written declaration by the insured reaffirming her application for the
first policy, stating that she ever since and then was in good health and
that her declaration to the medical examiner in her first application were
true and might be used as a part thereof. The statements of this declara-
tion were made directly to the agent. The insured died of cancer not long
after the policies were issued. The court held that the evidence of collusive
fraud was circumstantially conclusive.
I have no quarrel with this decision but I regret that the court did
not take the opportunity to plat the uncertain area referred to above. If
we accept the plaintiff's allegations as fact, the agent knew the true medical
history but did not know that the applicant had misrepresented that history
to the company. The agent's knowledge should be imputed to his principal,
the insurer, with the legal result that the insurer issued a policy which it
knew was voidable at the time of issuance for fraudulent misrepresentation.
What of that? An insured who had applied for his policy in innocence and
good faith could reasonably contend that he accepted the policy as a repre-
sentation that he was insured on the basis of the risks he described and that
he relied on that assurance, but the insured and also the beneficiary in the
instant case did not come to court with clean hands and it is hard to see
their right to assert an equitable estoppel, giving the facts the most chari-
table interpretation. The case is not an appropriate one for the doctrine
of waiver. A waiver is a conscious, deliberate, and conventional attempt to
vary the contract relationship and where, as here, any act which could
conceivably be considered an attempted waiver was contemporaneous with
the written contract, the parol evidence rule should prevent it from being
28
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shown. The case was a nice one for the supreme court to have demonstrated
the difference between an estoppel, to which the parol evidence rule is
never applicable but which does require good faith and reliance on the part
of the person claiming the estoppel, and a waiver, to which the parol evi-
dence rule may be applicable, but which does not necessarily require a
good faith reliance.
The growing volume of group insurance makes any decision defining
the rights established under typical group policies of special interest. In
Nick v. The Travelers Insurance Co.5 the defendant had issued a
group policy to plaintiff's employer which provided that the group insur-
ance should terminate when the employment should end, except in case of
total disability from injury or disease, but that temporary layoff or leave
of absence should not be considered as termination of employment for
the purpose of this insurance "unless the employer shall so elect." It also
provided that in case of the termination of the employment for any reason
whatsoever, the employee should be entitled to convert his group coverage
into individual insurance without further evidence of insurability. Part of
the premium for the group insurance was paid by the employee in the
form of a deduction from his monthly pay check. The employee was
temporarily laid off but the employer elected to terminate the insurance
and gave notice of that fact to the defendant insurer. It was held that
under this combination of facts the employee had an individual interest
in the group coverage which could not be terminated without notice to
him. It'appears that it would be unsafe to assert the necessity of notice
to the employee if any of the above facts were absent, though the supreme
court may ultimately broaden the scope of this ruling. In Johnson v. The
Travelers Insurance CoY the Kansas City Court of Appeals subsequent to
the Nick case, held that notice was not necessary where there was no ambi-
guity about the absolute and final character of the termination of the em-
ployee's employment.
The two most interesting cases decided by the Missouri Supreme
Court in 1945 in this field involve Workmen's Compensation Insurance.
Marslll's U. S. Auto Supply v. The Maryland Casualty Co.7 and State
ex rel Interstate Oil Company v. Bland" were both suits by employers against
5. 189 S. W. (2d) 532 (Mo. 1945).
6. 194 S. W. (2d) 938 (Mo. App. 1946).
7. 189 S. W. (2d) 529 (Mo. 1945).
8. 190 S. W. (2d) 227 (Mo. 1945).
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their insurance carriers for the expense to which the employers were put
in defending actions by employees, which actions the insurers had declined
to defend on behalf of the employers on the ground that they were out-
side the coverage of the policies. In both cases, policies had been issued
indemnifying the employer against liability for personal injuries sustained
by employees and, in identical terms, agreed "to defend, in the name and
on behalf of this employer, any suits or other proceedings which may at
any time be instituted against him on account of such injuries, including
suits or other proceedings alleging such injuries and demanding damages
or compensation therefor, although such suit, other proceedings, allegations
or demands are wholly groundless, false or fraudulent." Both policies also
stated that they did not afford insurance with respect to occupational
disease.
In the MVarshall case the employee claimed an injury from carbon
monoxide poisoning. He first filed with the Workmen's Compensation
Commission and received payment from the defendant insurer under the
Compensation Act. The employee subsequently withdrew his compensation
claim and brought suit against his employer, alleging that carbon monox-
ide poisoning contracted in the course of his employment under the cir-
cumstances set forth constituted an occupational disease, and that the
employer was liable for having negligently allowed the condition to exist
by reason of which such disease was contracted. This action the insured
refused to defend in the name of the employer and the latter was compelled
to defend at his own expense; this he did successfully, the Missouri Su-
preme Court ultimately deciding that the injury suffered by the employee
was not an occupational disease and not being within the exceptions to the
coverage of the Workmen's Compensation Act, the action was barred by
that statute. It might be noted in retrospect that the employee's only
contention was that his injury was an occupational disease; that neither
in the theory of his action, in the facts pleaded, nor in the facts which existed
(so far as such additional facts ever came to light) was there anything
to suggest the possibility of liability for common law negligence, other than
for accidental injury-which was barred by the statute-or occupational
disease-which the court held as a matter of law it was not. In the course
of its opinion in the Alarshall case, the court stated several times that the
insurer, in determining its obligations to defend on behalf of the employer,
could not rely entirely on the pleading of the employee in his action, but
must consider the actual facts (known to it or which could have been known
[Vol. 11
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to it from reasonable investigation). Nevertheless, it held for the defendant,
and the ruling seems to me to justify at least some reliance on the plead-
ing. At least, one finds occasional expression regarding the employee's
"theory of action."
In State ex rel. Inter-State Oil Company v. Bland9 the complaint in
the suit by the employee against the employer alleged negligence of the
employer which caused dermatitis to the employee. The insurer refused
to defend on the ground that the theory of the employee's action was
occupational disease, for which its liability was excepted as stated above.
That such was the theory of the employee's action, both the Kansas City
Court of Appeals and the Missouri Supreme Court both subsequently
agreed, but both courts refused to rule on the question of whether derma-
titis so incurred was in law an occupational disease. The employer "filed
answer in the nature of a denial, pleaded assumption of risk, and alleged
that the damages claimed were covered by the compensation laws of the
state of Kansas." It does not appear anywhere in the record of this suit,
upon what grounds the employer prevailed. In the instant suit, brought
by the employer to recover the expenses of his successful defense, the jury
returned a verdict for the insurer which the trial court set aside as against
the weight of the evidence. The insurer appealed to the Kansas City
Court of Appeals, which reversed the brder of the trial court on the ground
that the insurer was entitled to rely upon the employee's pleadings and
that the pleadings were brought upon the theory and alleged facts of an
occupational disease only. On certiorari, the Missouri Supreme Court
stated that such a ruling was in direct conflict with its recent decision in
the Marshall case and the opinion below was quashed. The supreme court
agreed with the construction of the employee's complaint given below but,
refusing to hold as a matter of law that dermatitis was an occupational
disease, it insisted upon the possibility that recovery might be had for the
employer's negligence resulting in loss which was neither traumatic (and
this within the Workmen's Compensation Act) or occupational disease (and
thus excepted by the policy).
In the more recent decision, the exoneration of the insurer in the
Marslall case was placed upon these grounds; "It was held that upon
the actual facts there was no duty on the part of the insurance companies
to defend because it appeared that the employee had sustained an accident,
9. Ibid.
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and hence exclusive of his cause of action was vested in a workmen's com-
pensation commission." It seems clear that this is not a satisfactory explan-
ation of the earlier case. By the terms of the policy, the insurer was obli-
gated to defend the employer against groundless suits, suits in which the
employee had no possibility of recovering either because the court lacked
jurisdiction, the complaint was technically defective, or the claim lacking
in substantial merit. The Marshall case is really a very strong one because,
at the time the suit against the insurer was instigated, it was established
as a matter of law that the employee's claim was not in fact or law within
the excepted liabilities of the insurer. Because the insurer is obligated to
defend groundless suits, so long as they are not suits for occupational dis-
ease, either the Marshall case was wrongly decided or it makes the question
of the insurer's obligation to defend depend upon the theory of the em-
ployee's action regardless of the legal or factual merit of that theory. In
the Interstate case, the court found an obligation to defend because facts
not pleaded might exist and be introduced, and theories not pleaded might
be valid and developed upon trial, establishing a liability other than for
occupational disease; but in the Marshall case, no obligation to defend
existed although the facts as a matter of law positively established a claim
other than occupational disease. The difference is that in the Interstate
situation, such liability of the employer might conceivably be enforced in
a suit a law whereas in the Marshall case, it could not, but under the
contractual obligation to defend groundless suits what difference does that
make? Surely the povision obligating the insurer to defend is not to be
construed as limiting that obligation to suits to which there is no juris-
dictional or statutory bar.
The policy involved in the Marshall case expressly stated that the
exception of occupational disease applied to the obligation to defend as
well as to the obligation of indemnity, and in the Interstate case, the court
went out of its way to assert that the exception in the policy, though not
stated as broadly, had the same scope. As applied to the obligation to
defend, what effect can be given to this exception unless the insurer can
rely upon the pleadings?
In State ex rel. Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Bland °
the defendant had issued to deceased a policy of life insurance providing
that "At any time while this policy is in force except as extended term
10. 189 S. W. (2d) 542 (Mo. 1945).
[Vol. 11
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insurance, and without the consent or participation of any beneficiary not
irrevocably designated, the Company will on receipt of this Policy properly
assigned, advance on the sole security hereof any amount up to the limit
secured by its cash surrender value. The sum advanced shall bear interest
at a rate of not to exceed six per cent per annum and may be repayed at
any time while the Policy is in force except as extended term insurance."
Subsequently, the deceased obtained an advance, executing at the time an
instrument which read: "In consideration of the loan to the undersigned
by The Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Company of the sum of ......
Dollars, payable at its Home Office in the City of Milwaukee, Wisconsin,
with interest at the rate of six (6) per cent, per annum, payable annually,
the undersigned, as security for the payment of said loan with interest,
hereby assign, transfer and set over to the said Company at Milwaukee,
Wisconsin, Policy Number ........ including all present and future additions
thereto. In case of the non-payment of any interest on said loan as above
provided, such interest shall be added to and become a part of the principal
of said loan and shall bear interest at the rate aforesaid . . ." When the
policy lapsed for non-payment of premium, the insurer applied the net
cash reserve to the purchase of extended term insurance. The insured died
shortly after the expiration of said term insurance as computed by the
insurer. The beneficiary contends that the insurer could not deduct, from
the reserve, the amount of compound interest on the advances and that the
net value properly computed was sufficient to purchase extended term
insurance beyond the date of the insured's death. The court held that the
policy was silent as to the time of payment of interest on the advances,
leaving that detail to agreement at the time of advance; that there was no
conflict between the policy and the agreement of advance; that an advance
of this nature by the insurance company should be distinguished from a
typical loan, inasmuch as there was no obligation to repay the advance, the
insurers' sole recourse being against the reserve accumulated on the policy;
and that it was consistent with insurance practices to charge compound
interest, inasmuch as the premium charged on an old-line policy, being paid
at the beginning of each period, are themselves discounted at compound
interest. The reader will observe that the agreement of advance provided
for interest at six per cent per annum, payable annually. This has a plausi-
ble consistency with the provision of the policy that interest not to exceed
six per cent per annum should be charged. But will the court, adhering to
its statement that the policy made no provision for the time of payment
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of interest, permit the insurer to impose, as a condition of obtaining the
advance promised under the policy, an agreement to pay interest at six
per acent per annum, payable monthly?
"If a building has been insured prior to the creation of a life tenancy
and is afterward destroyed, the property is in effect converted into per-
sonalty, and life tenant is entitled only to a life estate in the proceeds of
the insurance contract." Where, however, subsequent to the creation of the
life estate and prior to loss, the insurer, at the request of the life tenant,
attached a "rider" to the policy recognizing that the insurable interest
of the previous owner of the fee had ceased "and the title of the property
insured . . . is now vested in the name of (the life tenant) and the insurance
subject to all conditions of the said policy to continue in force," and there-
after the life tenant pays all the premiums on the policy, the life tenant is
entitled to receive and keep the full compensation for the damage to the
fee." The court points out that there is no obligation on the part of the
life tenant to insure for the benefit of the remainderman, that insurance is
a personal contract and that each person having a property interest may
insure to protect his own interest, and there was no breach of a fiduciary
relationship which in good conscience would prevent the life tenant from
claiming the entire value of the policy. It would seem sound insurance law
to restrict the recovery of the life tenant to the value of his interest, despite
the fact that the face amount of the policy covers the entire fee, but pre-




While the 1945 Missouri property cases are fewer in number than be-
fore World War II, because many parties and witnesses were in military
service and, consequently, potential Supreme Court cases did not get
through even the trial stage, the bulk is still so large that no attempt has
11. Farmers' Mutual Fire & Lightning Ins. Co. v. Crowley, 190 S. W. (2d)
250 (Mo. 1945).
*Professor of Law, University of Missouri. B.S., University of Illinois, 1935,
LL.B., 1937; Sterling Fellow, Yale University, 1937-1938.
[Vol. 11
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been made to brief or discuss all of them., Most of the cases discussed have
been selected for one of three reasons: first, because they are cases of first
impression in Missouri; second, because they overrule or modify, in im-
portant respects, earlier Missouri decisions; and third, because holdings or
dicta seem to be of dubious soundness.
CONCURRENT OWNERSHIP
In Dodd v. McGee2 a testator devised Blackacre to his widow for life,
with remainder to his daughter and the heirs of her body. The daughter
and her children sued the widow for partition. The daughter contended
that she was a tenant in common and that both the life estates and re-
mainders were subject to partition. The daughter advanced the argument
that the widow and daughter were tenants in common by reason of Mis-
souri Revised Statutes (1939) section 354 which provides as follows: "Every
interest in real estate granted or devised to two or more persons, other than
executors and trustees and husband and wife, shall be a tenancy in common,
unless expressly declared, in such grant or devise, to be in joint tenancy." 3
Instead of summarily rejecting this argument, the court examined it with
exceptional patience, and concluded that in spite of the statute it is possible
in Missouri to create a life estate and remainder, and that the testator had
done so in the instant case. The court reaffirmed its previous holdings that
the remainder created by the fee-tail statute4 is a contingent remainder,
and not a vested remainder subject to open to let in after-born issue.5
The court also held that partition did not lie between successive estates
under the basic statute on partition,6 and that this case did not fall within
the section providing for sale and reinvestment of successive estates in the
case of certain burdensome and unprofitable possessory estates subject to
future interests. 7
1. See Gill, 1946 Annotated Supplement, Missouri Titles (3d ed. 1931)
390416 for references to the following: Missouri Supreme Court cases not included
in the scope of the present study; Missouri Constitution of 1945; Missouri Supreme
Court rules; Missouri Court of Appeals cases; and Federal cases and regulations.
2. 190 S. W. (2d) 231 (Mo. 1945).
3. The daughter relied also on King v. Theis, 272 Mo. 416, 199 S. W. 183
(1917).
4. Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) § 3498.
5. This problem is completely analyzed in an admirable opinion by Bohling,
C., in Mattingly v. Washburn, 196 S. W. (2d) 624 (Mo. 1946)...
6. Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) § 1709.
7. Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) § 1710.
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In Gaede v. Smithk land purchased with the separate funds of a married
woman, the plaintiff, was conveyed to the woman and her husband, as
tenants by the entirety. Later, in contemplation of separation and divorce,
both parties signed an agreement, drafted by the wife, dividing all of their
personal property, and by which her husband agreed "to waive all rights
on" the real estate in question. After the wife obtained her divorce she
brought an action to quiet title against her former husband. He filed a
cross-section asking for partition, on the theory that he and his former
wife had been tenants by the entirety, and that they became tenants in
common after the divorce. Judgment for the plaintiff was affirmed. The
court held that the basic conveyance created a tenancy by the entirety,
applying the presumption of gift of the interest by the spouse furnishing
the purchase price to the other spouse. But the court held that the former
husband had relinquished whatever interest he had in the land, and that
thereafter his former wife held the farm as sole owner. In the instant case
the contract was drawn without advice of counsel. After litigation it proved
effective as between the parties. Had the parties been advised by counsel,
the transaction would have been set up with properly drafted instruments
to accomplish two other important objects: first, to preclude reopening the
issue of alimony, by court approval of the settlement in the divorce action;O
and second, to keep the title marketable.
The art of drafting legal instruments frequently does not receive the
attention it deserves, 0 nor does a skilled draftsman always receive the fee
his services should command. A frequent source of trouble is the attempt
of a scrivener to use a blank form for a purpose for which it is ill-adapted,
by merely filling in blanks. This may have been the source of the trouble
in Davidson v. Eubanks" where a conveyance was made by general war-
ranty deed in 1921 to a husband and wife. The pertinent portions of the
deed are as follows:
"This Indenture, Made on the 19th day of February, 1921,
by and between James M. Edgar and Mary J. Edgar, his wife,
of Carroll County, Missouri parties of the first part and C. P.
8. 190 S. W. (2d) 931 (Mo. 1945).
9. North v. North, 339 Mo. 1226, 100 S. W. (2d) 582 (1936), 109 A. L. R.
1061, 1068 (1937); Davis v. Davis, 196 S. W. (2d) 447 (Mo. App. 1946).
10. The School of Law, University of Missouri, recently has added a senior
course, Drafting of Legal Instruments, to give advanced training in the draftsman-
ship problems considered in other courses.
11. 189 S. W. (2d) 295 (Mo. 1945).
[Vol. 11
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Roberson and Mary Roberson, as tenants in common of the county
of Carroll in the State of Missouri party of the second part,
"Witnesseth, The said party of the first part ... do by these
presents, Grant, Bargain and Sell, Convey and Confirm unto the
said party of the second part, their heirs and assigns, the following
described Lots, Tracts or Parcels of Land, ...
"To Have and To Hold the premises aforesaid, ... unto the
said party of the second part, and unto their heirs and assigns for-
ever ... ." [Italics added.]
The husband died in 1928 and his wife died in 1935. The plaintiffs, heirs-
at-law of the husband, brought an action in ejectment and to partition, on
the theory that the husband and wife were tenants in common, and as heirs
of the husband they were entitled to one-half. The defendants, successors
to the wife's interest, contended that the husband and wife were tenants
by the entirety, and that the wife took the whole when her husband died,
and that his heirs-at-law have no interest. Judgment for the defendants
was reversed on appeal. The court pointed out that the words "as tenants
in common" appeared only in the premises and not in their appropriate
places, the granting and habendum clauses, but that "the intention of the
parties, especially the grantor, as gathered from the four corners of the deed,
is now the pole star of construction."1 2 The position of the words is im-
portant only because "words when used in one connection or setting may
or may not be vague or equivocal, although if used in other connection
the same words may be of clear or certain meaning. The words 'as tenants
in common' are not vague or equivocal, whether used in connection with
and descriptive of the grantees, or in, or in connection with, an operative
clause of the deed."' 8 In reaching its conclusion that the deed created
a tenancy in common the court considered several earlier Missouri cases,
4
12. Ibid. at 299.
13. Ibid. at 300.
14. Wilson v. Frost, 186 Mo. 311, 85 S. W. 375 (1905) [held a tenancy by en-
tireties where the premises provided as follows: ". . . and William Cook and Mary
E. Cook of the county of Daviess and State of Missouri, parties of the second part,
that is to say, to the said William Cook thfe one undivided one-half interest and the
said Mary E. Cook the other one undivided half interest"].
Ashbaugh v. Ashbaugh, 273 Mo. 353, 201 S. W. 72 (1918) [held a tenancy by
entireties where the premises provided as follows: ". . . and H. H. Ashbaugh and
Elizabeth, his wife, each an undivided one-half interest, of thfe County of Pike, in
the state of Missouri, parties of the second part"].
Wilhite v. Wilhite, 284 Mo. 387, 224 S. W. 448 (1920) [held a tenancy by en-
tireties where the premises provided as follows: ". . . and William Wilhite and Mar-
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The source of the difficulty in the principal case just considered and
in several of the cases in the footnotes evidently was in the use of the com-
mon blank of warranty deed. This form in the premises has several blank
lines for naming the parties of the second part:
"and ............................................................................................................
of the County of .................................. , State of ...................................
part ------------------- of the Second Part."
The grant is "unto the said part ................ of the Second Part," and the
habendum is "unto the said part ................ of the Second Part, and to ............
heirs and assigns, forever." Neither the granting clause nor the habendum
has any blank space in which to designate the quantum or quality of the
estate granted. Consequently, the draftsman who does not take the time,
ot have the skill to rewrite and adapt the form to his special need, simply
designates the type of estate in the long blank in the premises.,, The
blank form works well enough for a tenancy by entireties, or a tenancy in
common between strangers, because of the statutory presumption of tenancy
by entireties and tenancy in common, respectively. 6 Even with the benefit
of the statutory presumption, it is better practice to specify more particu-
larly the interest each grantee is to take.17 In the principal case, the litiga-
tion might have been avoided had the draftsman specified "as tenants in
common, and not as tenants by entireties and not as joint tenants." Much
better, of course,' would have been properly drafted granting and habendum
clauses.
It is believed that the inexperienced draftsman would benefit from an
occasional rereading of an elaborate English conveyance, Although in
garet A. Wilhite, share and share alike of the county of Boone, in the State of Mis-
souri, parties of the second part").
Peters v. Peters, 312 Mo. 609, 280 S. W. 424 (1926) [h'eld a tenancy in common
where the granting clause provided as follows: ". . . bargain, sell, transfer and convey
to the said John Schachner and Sophie Schachner, his wife, as tenants in common,
and to their heirs and assigns forever"].
15. Frequently even more inappropriate blank spaces are used. Examples in
the 1945 cases include Mizell v. Osman, 189 S. W. (2d) 306 (Mo. 1945) [blank fol-
!owing description]; Ruff v. Young, 190 S. W. (2d) 208 (Mo. 1945) [blank follow-
ing warranty].
16. Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) § 3504.
17. GILL, MISSOURI REAL ESTATE FORMS (2d ed. 1931) Form No. 346 [tenan-
cy by entireties]; Form No. 347 [joint tenancy between strangers]; and Form No.
348 [tenancy in common between strangers].
18. The most accessible is found in 2 BI. Comm., Appendix, No. II, a two
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form a two part indenture, the usual Missouri deed is in reality a deed
poll. In the more complicated cases, some of the draftsmanship problems
are simplified if a deed poll is used, or if an indenture of more than two
parts is used.
ADVERSE POSSESSION AND USER
Although the decision itself is not open to question, the correctness
of certain broad and unqualified statements in Adains v. Wrigtt'19 is open
to question. The defendant entered into possession of land under a con-
tract of purchase and made various payments during the next three years.
She never received a deed. The vendor conveyed the land in 1932 to another,
and the plaintiff acquired paper title through mesne conveyances. Before
completing the purchase of the land, the plaintiff examined the land and
found the defendant in possession; the defendant told him "that she had
bought the property and it was hers and she was going to stay there" and
that "she owned it and wouldn't get off." The plaintiff brought an action
in ejectment and to determine title. The defense was adverse possession
and payment. From an order sustaining the plaintiff's motion for a new
trial after verdict for the defendant, the defendant appealed. The case
was reversed and remanded, with direction to reinstate the verdict for the
defendant and to enter judgment thereon. The court held that the de-
fendant had made a submissable issue on the question of payment. In the
course of its opinion the court made several statements regarding adverse
possession. "Under the facts, if defendant did not pay for the land there
would be no question on adverse possession. . . . One rule of real property
law is that where the vendor has delivered possession to the vendee, but
retains le'al title under a contract to deliver a deed when the purchase
money is fully paid (likely the case here), the holding of the vendee will
not be deemed adverse and the statute of limitation will not begin to run
until the purchase price is paid. . . . There was no issue and there could
have been no issue on title by adverse possession prior to payment. '2°
Undoubtedly the doctrine stated is generally true, so long as the relation-
ship continues to be that of vendor and purchaser, and there is no repudi-
ation by the purchaser of the relationship and notice to the vendor or his
successor of such repudiation and adverse claim.21 But there would seem
19. 353 Mo. 1226, 187 S. W. (2d) 216 (1945).
20. 187 S. W. (2d) 216, 218-219 (1945).
21. See Brady v. Garrett, 66 S. W. (2d) 502 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933), an interest-
ing case concerned with a bailment of the Colt pistol used in the killing of Billy the
Kid, where the bailee had possession for twenty-seven years; it was held that the
statute of limitations had not run, because the bailor had no notice of conversion.
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to be no absolute rule of law as indicated in the quotation supra that
possession never can be adverse as between vendor and purchaser in pos-
session. It would seem that the defendant's statements to the plaintiff
in 1939 that she owned the land and would not get off, coupled with her
possession, were enough to make her possession thereafter adverse, and to
start the statute of limitations running in 1939. Of course, the ten year
statute had not run in this case, because action was started in 1941, and
possession had been adverse for only two years. The preferable analysis
would seem to be that the defendant could not avail herself of the defense
of the statute of limitations under the facts of this case, because possession
was not adverse for the period 1927-1939, under the broad rule stated by
the court, and had been adverse for a period short of the statute, viz.,
1939-1941.
The character of the intent necessary in satisfying the requirements
for adverse possession has presented many difficulties. Missouri Coal Co.
v. Walker2 repeats what has been said in many Missouri cases: "Defendants
had the burden of proving all essential elements of an adverse possession
for the statutory time, including an unequivocal claim of ownership" (italics
added]. But there is another line of Missouri authority beginning with
Clemens v. Runckel23 and reaffirmed in Stonum v. Davis24 holding that
possession may be adverse to the true owner and ripen into title, even
though the possessor believes the land to be government land, and recog-
nizes what he mistakenly believes is a paramount right in the government. 2
It would seem to be clear that this line of cases holds that adverse posses-
sion does not require an unequivocal claim of ownership. In Missouri Coal
Co. v. Walker, supra, an action in ejectment and to quiet title, the defend-
ant entered into possession in 1928 of an island, title to which was in the
county. He thought it was "government" land and that sometime he would
apply for a title. -He had remained in possession for longer than the appli-
cable ten year period 20 when the county court issued a patent to the plain-
tiff. Judgment for the plaintiff was affirmed. The court purports to follow
22. 188 S. W. (2d) 39 (Mo. 1945).
23. 34 Mo. 41, 84 Am. Dec. 69 (1863).
24. 348 Mo. 267, 152 S. W. (2d) 1067 (1941), overruling Hunnewell v.
Burchett, 152 Mo. 611, 54 S. W. 487 (1899), and Heckescher v. Cooper, 203 Mo.
278, 101 S. W. 658 (1907).
25. A recent case states that the possession puts the owner on notice and starts
the statute running, and need not be against the whole world to accomplish this notice
function. Roach v. Knappenberger, 172 Ark. 417 (1926), 288 S. W. 912 (1926).
26. Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) § 12791.
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the "unequivocal claim of ownership" rule, and does not mention the other
line of authority. The court also finds that the defendant recognized the
superior title of the county by the following line of reasoning: the law
puts title in the county; the defendant is presumed to know the law; there-
fore the defendant knew the county had title, and when the defendant said
he thought it was "govrnment" land, he meant "county" land. Probably
this is proper at the appellate stage when the evidence presented by the
defendant at the trial stage was ambiguous. It is submitted that if at the
trial stage the defendant proved that he recognized only superior rights
in the United States government, his possession was adverse to the county
government, and was of such character as would ripen into title.
Tkree Way Land Co. v. Wells 27 involved possession beyond the true
line to a mistaken boundary line, and whether such possession is adverse.
The case is discussed below in the section on the Statute of Frauds.
Joint driveways present no special problem if properly created by
express grant or express reservation, duly recorded. Where a common owner
of two houses with a joint driveway conveys one of the houses without
expressly granting an easement in the retained premises, and without ex-
pressly reserving an easement in the granted premises, there is much more
difficulty, and the solution generally turns on implied grant or reservation
of a quasi-easement, or upon adverse user. Jacobs v.. Brewster28 involved
a joint concrete driveway and double garage built in 1924 by adjoining
landowners who shared the cost of construction. The driveway had been
used jointly for almost twenty years, when one owner brought action to
quiet title and to enjoin the other's use of the driveway. It is not necessary
to argue at length that reciprocal easements should be found in such a case.
The difficulty is in finding satisfactory and consistent legal reasons to sup-
port such a conclusion. Courts generally have applied one of two theories
in these cases: first, the fictional lost grant, or prescription; and second,
adverse user, similar to adverse possession. Missouri has adopted the
adverse user theory, as distinguished from the lost grant theory. In the
principal case the court examines at length the,various elements necessary
to constitute adverse user. The most difficult element to satisfy is that of
adverse or hostile use, as distinguished from permissive use, when, as a
matter of fact, there was no hostility but only acquiescence in the use. The
27. 185 S. W. (2d) 795 (Mo. 1945).
28. 190 S. W. (2d) 894 (Mo. 1945).
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court, with skillful analysis, holds that reciprocal easements had been cre-
ated by adverse user. An alternative theory, which avoids most of the
theoretical difficulties in adverse user, is that the basic transaction was a
parol grant of an easement, followed by user and expenditures or improve-
ments, and that specific performance will be granted in such a case in spite
of the statute of frauds.
STATUTE OF FRAUDS
Three Way Land Co. v. Wells2 9 involved a mistaken boundary line.
In 1934 the owner of a certain section of land conveyed the north one-half
to the plaintiff's predecessor in title and the south one-half to the defendant.
At the time of the conveyance there was an old fence row and ditch 200
feet north of the true line. In 1935 the defendant and plaintiff's predecessor
each built half of a new fence on the old fence row, the plaintiff's prede-
cessor taking it for granted that it was the true line. The plaintiff's prede-
cessor in 1935 became suspicious that the fence row was not the true line,
and made a survey in 1938. Later the plaintiff brought action to try title
to land, and in ejectment. Judgment for the plaintiff was affirmed. Defend-
ant could not claim title to the 200 foot strip on the theory of adverse pos-
session, because the plaintiff's suit was brought less than ten years after
the defendant's possession began. Defendant based his claim on an agreed
or practical boundary between himself and the plaintiff's predecessor in
title. Two types of cases must be distinguished. Where there is a dis-
puted boundary, many jurisdictions hold that a parol agreement fixing a
line as the true boundary, followed by possession, is conclusive against the
owners and those claiming under them, without lapse of any period of time,
notwithstanding the statute of frauds.30 But where a mistaken boundary is
simply acquiesced in, the acquiescence must continue for the period of the
statute of limitations, and even then there is a serious question as to whether,
the intention is such as satisfies the requisites for adverse possession.A' The
principal case would seem to fall into the latter category.12
In O'Day v. Van Leeuweni 3 the court held that an oral contract to
29. 185 S. W. (2d) 795 (Mo. 1945).
30. See Archer v. Helm, 69 Miss. 730, 11 So. 3 (1892); Note (1930) 69 A. L. R.
1430, citing Missouri cases at p. 1437.
31. See City of Rock Springs v. Sturm, 39 Wyo. 494, 273 Pac. 908, 97 A. L. R.
1, 14 (1935).
32. See Head, Work of Missouri Supreme Court for 1941-Property (1942) 7
Mo. L. REv. 408, 409-411.
33. 190 S. NV. (2d) 263 (Mo. 1945).
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exchange real estate followed by possession is binding notwithstanding the
statute of frauds, and that specific performance of the oral contract will be
granted.
STATUTE OF WILLS
Mizell v. Osmon30 involved a number of questions of property law,
only one of which is here examined. A grandmother executed and recorded
a deed to certain land, naming her grandchildren as grantees. The deed
was in usual form except for a clause immediately following the description
of the real estate: "The said land to remain in my possession and this deed
only to be void and in force at my death." The grantees were in possession
of the land at the time the instrument was executed and recorded, and re-
mained in possession thereafter. The court held that the instrument was
a deed, not a will, and granted an immediate interest to the grantees, sub-
ject to a reservation of a life estate in the grantor.3 5 The words "this deed
only to be void and in force at my death" have no effect becausei they are
ambiguous, meaningless, and the terms used are repugnant to each other
and the remainder of the deed.
In Rliff v. Young3G a related problem was presented. Immediately fol-
lowing the covenant of warranty was the following: "Said parties of the
first part hereby reserve a life estate in aforesaid premises, and title is to
vest in party of the second part at their natural death." The court held
the instrument was not testamentary, the word "title" meaning "posses-
sion," following Wimpey v.. Ledford.37
BOUNDARIES
In Americani Steel & Wire Co. of New Jersey v. City of St. Louis3s cer-
tain land was platted with a tow path between the eastern boundary of the
lots and the Mississippi river. The common owner conveyed a parcel
"Bounded as follows: ... East by a Tow or Water Street." Later the street
was abandoned, and both the grantor and remote grantee claimed the lands
underlying the street and accretions on the river side thereof. The court
quieted title in the remote grantee, reaffirming the general rule that absent
34. 189 S. W. (2d) 306 (Mo. 1945).
35. See Eckhardt, Work of Missouri Supreme Court-1938-Property (1939)
4 Mo. L. REv. 419,419-421.
36. 190 S. W. (2d) 208 (Mo. 1945).
37. 177 S. W. 302, 11 A. L. R. 7 (Mo. Sup. 1915).
38. 190 S. W. (2d) 919 (Mo. 1945).
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an express reservation, a conveyance of land bounded on a public highway
or street, even though described by metes and bounds giving courses and
distances not including the highway or street, carries with it the fee to the
center of the street, and the extension of the rule to include the fee of the
entire street, of a dedication of all the land for the street was made by only
one grantor under circumstances similar to this case. Upon abandonment
of the public use, the owner holds the land free of the servitude.
BONA FIDE PURCHASER
In McAboy v. Packer the facts were as follows. McAboy acquired
certain land in 1932. In 1938 the land was sold for taxes to Johnson. In
1941 Johnson sued McAboy in ejectment and to quiet title; in a cross peti-
tion McAboy pleaded that the tax deed was void and asked that it be
canceled because of inadequacy of the price, $79.05, for land valued at $1000
to $2000. Judgment was for the plaintiff, and title was quieted in Johnson.
McAboy appealed, but the appeal was dismissed for failure to comply with
the supreme court rules. Thereafter, Johnson conveyed for $1000 to Pack-
er, McAboy's tenant, by a deed warranting only against persons claiming
under the grantor. Then McAboy sued out a writ of error, and the supreme
court reversed the decree quieting title in Johnson, and quieted title in
McAboy. McAboy now sues Packer to quiet title. Packer claims that he
is not a lis pendens purchaser, having purchased for valuable consideration
and in good faith after the appeal was dismissed and before the writ of error
was sued out. The court conceded the correctness of this rule, but held it
was not applicable in this case. The deed, with special warranty, just as
a quitclaim deed, at least puts the purchaser on inquiry as to outstanding
legal rights of equities, and he has notice of the facts such inquiries would
elicit. In addition, Packer was a tenant of McAboy, testified in the first
suit, and irrespective of the form of conveyance to him, had notice of Mc-
Aboy's claim.40
HOMESTEAD
Hallauer v. Lackey4' settled an issue on homestead exemption in favor
of a position which had been tacitly assumed in earlier Missouri cases.
Property owned by a wife was sold at sheriff's sale under execution on a
39. 353 Mo. 1219, 187 S. W. (2d) 207 (1945).
40. The problem is thoroughly discussed in 59 A. L. R. 632.
41. 353 Mo. 1244, 188 S. W. (2d) 30 (1945).
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judgment against the wife, without personal notice to the wife and with-
out opportunity for her to claim her exemptions. The husband and wife
had lived on the land and the husband had not claimed any homestead
exemption in his own property. Even though the wife was not the "head
of the family" the sale was held void.
MORTGAGES
Straw Parties
"The voice is Jacob's voice, but the hands are the hands of Esau." 42
The functions of the straw party in real estate transactions and Missouri
authorities with respect to straw parties was examined at some length
several years ago by Mr. McCune Gill.43 Problems involving straw parties
have arisen in a number of Missouri cases in 1945.
In National Refining Co. v. Continental Development Corp..4 the
National Refining Co., plaintiff, through its agent sold real estate to the
Glick Real Estate Co. for $9000, of which $1000 was paid in cash. The
conveyance ran to one Zuckerman, a stenographer in the office of the Glick
Real Estate Co. She in turn executed a note for the balance of the pur-
chase money, secured by a deed of trust on the property. After default, and
the day before foreclosure, the straw party conveyed certain parcels of
land ownd by the Glick Real Estate Co. and others, title to which she
held as straw party, to the Continental Development Corp., the defendant.
In a suit to set aside the conveyances the plaintiff contended that these
transfers were in fraud of the grantor's creditors,45 and asked that the
parcels be subjected to the payment of its deficiency judgment against the
straw party. Judgment for the defendant was affirmed. The plaintiff,
through its agent, knew that Zuckerman was only a straw party and had
no beneficial ownership of other property. The court points out that no
deficiency judgment had been sought against the Glick Real Estate Co.
In Fried v. Marbllrger?6 one Scott, owner of certain real estate, had
42. Gen. XXVII:22; quoted in Hecker v. Putney, 196 S. W. (2d) 442 (Mo.
App. 1946). It must be emphasized that the use of straw parties in many cases is
entirely proper, and in some cases is indispensable, e.g., in the creation of a tenancy
by the entireties in land already owned by one of the spouses.
43. Gill, Strawmen in Missouri, 14 Mo. BAR J. 98 (1943). See also Cook, Straw
Men in Real Estate Transactions (1940) 25 WASH. U. L. Q. 232; State ex rel. Mesker
v. Reynolds, 245 S. W. 1065 (Mo. Sup. 1922), 25 A. L. R. 1484, 1486 (1923).
44. 189 S. W. (2d) 551 (Mo. 1945).
45. Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) § 3507.
46. 353 Mo. 1146, 186 S. W. (2d) 584 (1945).
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title in a straw party, one Marburger, his secretary. She executed a deed
of trust naming Scott, the owner, as trustee, to secure payment of 160 notes
of $500 each. The trust deed provided that foreclosure could be had only
upon the written request of the holders of a majority of the notes, and
permitted the trustee to charge a commission for collecting the rent. The
plaintiff, Fried, a noteholder, brought action to foreclose and for the ap-
pointment of a receiver. The trial court appointed a reciever, and Scott,
owner-trustee, and Marburger, the straw party, appeal. The court said that
the plaintiff might have had a good case for the removal of Scott as trus-
tee and to require him to account, on the ground that an owner cannot
qualify as trustee, and that while a disinterested trustee properly may
be compensated for management, a trustee who is the real owner cannot
be compensated. But the plaintiff did not ask for this relief, and had not
proved grounds for relief from the valid provisions requiring the consent
of the majority of the noteholders for foreclosure; and because the appoint-
ment of a receiver was incidental to such relief, the trial court erred in
refusing to revoke the appointment of the receiver.
In Woolridge v. Dittmeer47 the court affirmed a judgment setting aside
a foreclosure sale pursuant to a power of sale in a deed of trust, where, in
addition to inadequacy of price, the noteholder by means of a straw
party was trustee and sold to himself. Where a trustee sells to himself the
sale is void, and actual fraud need not be proved.
Equitable Mortgages
The earliest recognition of equitable mortgages was in cases of con-
veyances, absolute in form, made to secure a loan but unenforceable at
lawv as a mortgage by the mortgagor because the conveyance did not con-
tain a defeasance clause.43 Parol evidence is admissable to prove that a
conveyance, absolute in form, was given to secure a debt, just as it is ad-
missible in cases of fraud, mistake, failure of consideration, or other basis
for equitable intervention. The doctrine is well setablished in Missouri.49
In Miller v. Miller0 a father owned land worth $4400 to $5000, encum-
bered with a lien for $2200 for delinquent drainage taxes. The father re-
quested from a bank a loan to be secured by a deed of trust on the land to
47. 190 S. W. (2d) 926 (Mo. 1945).
48. Y. B. 9 Edw. IV, 25, 34 (1470).
49. Williamson v. Frazee, 294 Mo. 320, 242 S. W. 958 (1922).
50. 353 Mo. 884, 184 S. NV. (2d) 1011 (1945).
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pay off the taxes, but the bank objected because the father was eighty years
of age and probably would not live to the maturity of the loan, and sug-
gested as an alternative that he convey the land to one son and'his wife
as tenants by the entirety, who in turn would execute the note and deed
of trust. On January 3, 1938, as contemporaneous acts, the father conveyed
by warranty deed absolute on its face to his son and wife as tenants by the
entirety for a recited consideration of $2000, and the son and his wife
executed a note and deed of trust for $2200, and the son paid the delin-
quent drainage taxes with the proceeds of the loan. The father died later in
1938, having remained in possession of the land; the son entered into pos-
session of the land in 1939; in 1942 he paid the note and the deed of trust
was released. The other heirs-at-law of the father brought an action to
partition, and for accounting. A decree for the plaintiffs was affirmed. In
determining whether a deed absolute on its face is a mortgage the most
important fact is the relation of the amount of the consideration or "price"
to the value of the property conveyed. In this case the court emphasizes
that the consideration was $2000 [$2200?], and the land was worth $4400.
The fact that the consideration was only half of the fair appraised value
is a strong indication of mortgage rather than sale. The court did not
analyze the other factors in detail, but the following indicia of mortgage
were supported by the evidence: negotiation for a loan of the approximate




During the year 1945 there were a number of interesting cases decided
by the Supreme Court of Missouri in the field of taxation. These cases have
been separated for discussion on a topical basis.
I. TAx STATUTES IN CONFLICT WITH CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
In the case of Allied Mutual Insurance Co. v. Bell,' a bill was amended
during its passage through the General Assembly so as to levy a tax on
domestic mutual insurance companies, other than life and fire, where no
*Attorney, St. Louis, LL.B.. University of Missouri. 1931.
1. 353 Mo. 891, 185 S. W. (2d) 4 (1945).
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tax had been levied on such companies by the terms of the original bill.
This amendment was held to change the "original purpose" of the bill
and to make the bill unconstitutional as in violation of Section 25 of Article
IV of the Constitution of 1875. The provisions of Section 25 of Article IV
of the Constitution of 1875 were readopted without any change as part
of Section 21 of Article III of the Constitution of 1945.
In the case of State ex rel Fire District of Lemay v. Smitk,2 the con-
stitutionality of an act providing for the establishment and incorporation
of fire districts in counties now or hereafter having a population between
200,000 and 400,000 and providing for the levy and assessment of taxes,
etc. was attacked in a suit to register the bonds which were authorized
by the act for the purpose of acquiring the necessary property and equip-
ment. The court held that the law was not a local or special law in viola-
tion of Section 53 of Article IV of the Constitution of 1875 (now Section
40 of Article III of the Constitution of 1945) even though at the present
time the act only applied to St. Louis County and modified the rules
and holdings in several of its prior cases. The court further held that cer-
tain sections were invalid because the subject matter thereof was not ex-
pressed in the title of the act in violation of Section 28 of Article IV of the
Constitution of 1875 (readopted in substance as Section 23 of Article III
of the Constitution of 1945.) This case is interesting in that it demon-
strates that our supreme court will make every effort to uphold constructive
legislation.
II. UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION TAXES.
In the case of State ex rel Keitel v. Harris,8 the supreme court held
that after the Unemployment Compensation Commission had filed its
certificate of assessment of unpaid taxes in the circuit court and secured
the issuance of an execution pursuant to. the provisions of Section 9436
of the Missouri Revised Statutes (1939) as amended by the Missouri Laws
(1943), pp. 917, 944, 947, the taxpayer had a right to file a "Motion to
Quash Execution and Strike Transcript from Record;" that the taxpayer
could not go behind the record and retry the whole administrative pro-
ceeding on its merits; and that his challenge must be limited to the "funda-
mental sufficiency of the certificate, and also to its primau facie validity as
a judgment together with that of the execution-the same as might be
done in the case of ordinary judgments and executions."
2. 353 Mo. 807, 184 S. W. (2d) 593 (1945).
3. 353 Mo. 1043, 186 S. W. (2d) 31 (1945).
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In the case of American National Insurance Company v. Keitel,4 the
supreme court held that an industrial insurance agent working strictly on
a commission basis was not entitled to unemployment compensation bene-
fits. This case is interesting in that the history of the provision exempting
insurance agents working on a commission basis 5 is discussed and in that
great weight is given to the interpretation of the same language in the
Federal Acte from which it was adopted.
III. INCOME TAXEs
In the case of In re Breuer's Income Tax,7 the supreme court held that
the unused portion of an allowance to a circuit judge for the expense of
holding court in counties other than his home county constituted taxable
income. In other words, a circuit judge must show in detail the exact amount
of his traveling expenses in order to be entitled to a deduction therefor
and the $1,200.00 traveling allowance must for accounting purposes be
treated as income. The interesting feature of this case is that the supreme
court indicated the defense of res judicata would not be permitted in tax
cases inasmuch as it might give one taxpayer an unfair advantage over
other taxpayers.
IV. TAXES LEvIED BY MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
In the case of City of St. Charles v. St. Charles Gas Co.,8 the supreme
court reaffirmed the rule that the state's delegation of authority to a muni-
cipality to tax must be clear. In his case the court held that a statute author-
izing the City of St. Charles to tax "light, power and water companies"
did not authorize the City to tax a gas company where the gas was used
almost exclusively for cooking and heating. "Gas" was held not to be
included in the term "light.
V. FIRE DISTRICTS
In the case of State ex rel Fire District of Lemay v. Smith,9 the supreme
court upheld the constitutionality of a law authorizing the incorporation
of fire protection districts in unincorporated districts in St. Louis CountyY'0
4. 353 Mo. 1107, 186 S. W. (2d) 447 (1945).
5. Mo. Laws 1941, p. 580.
6. 26 U. S. C. A. § 1607 (c) (14).
7. 190 S. W. (2d) 248 (Mo. 1945).
8. 353 Mo. 996, 185 S. W. (2d) 797 (1945).
9. 353 Mo. 807, 184 S. W. (2d) 593 (1945).
10. See note I, supra, for a discussion of the constitutional law questions.
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VI. SCHOOL DIsTicrs
In the case of State ex reL Consolidated School District v. Smith," the
supreme court held that an act of the legislature adopted in 194112 did
not provide an exclusive method of consolidation of school districts so as
to prevent consolidation under the provisions of Sections 10,493-10,500 Mis-
souri Revised Statutes (1939).
VII. REVENUE BONDS OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
In the case of City of Springfield v. Monday,"3 the supreme court up-
held the validity of revenue bonds payable only out of a special fund pro-
duced by the revenue of the utility and which were issued without the
authorization of an election. Under the new Constitution, 4 revenue bonds
for such purposes will have to be authorized by an election carried by a
four-sevenths (4/7) majority before they will be valid.
VIII. DRAINAGE AND SEWER TAXES
In the case of State ex rel County of St. Louis v. St. Johns-Overland
Sanitary Sewer District,'1 the supreme court held that a sewer district
was required to obtain an easement to consrtuct its sewers through public
highways; that it was liable for the damage which it caused to public
highways; that the district cannot be compelled to repair the roads unless
it has available assets to do so; but that the county could obtain a judg-
ment and compel the issuance of a warrant for the damages. In the case
of State ex rel Jacoby v. Missouri Valley Drainage District,"o the supreme
court held that mandamus would not lie to compel the levy of a tax unless
there is a specific statute authorizing the tax and the levy is in accordance
with the terms of the statute; but that relator could get an equitable lien
established if the district will not take the necessary steps so that a tax
can be levied to pay relator's judgment.
In Harrell v. Surface,17 a cestui que trust was not made a party de-
fendant in a suit to foreclose Little River Drainage District taxes, but all
other persons having an interest in the land in question were joined, includ-
11. 353 Mo. 840, 184 S. W. (2d) 452 (1945).
12. Mo. Laws 1941, pp. 545, 546.
13. 353 Mo. 981, 185 S. W. (2d) 788 (1945).
14. MO. CONsT. Art. VI, § 27.
15. 353 Mo. 974, 185 S. W. (2d) 780 (1945).
16. 353 Mo. 1005, 185 S. W.- (2d) 800 (1945).
17. 190 S. W. (2d) 939 (Mo. 1945).
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ing the trustee in the deed of trust. The court held that the purchaser
at the execution sale acquired a legal title superior to the cestui que trust;
and that the cestui que trust merely had an equitable right of redemption
which was subject to the bar of laches.
IX. TAx SALEs AND TITLES
During the year 1945, the supreme court rendered two more decisions
holding that the considerations paid at the tax sales in question were so
grossly inadequate and unconscionable as to amount to fraud.18 In Daniel
v. Mollett,19 a consideration of $205.00 paid for fifty-three acres of land
worth in excess of $1,060.00 where the taxes due amounted to $430.10 was
held to be a fraud on both the plaintiffs and the State of Missouri. In De
Tienne v. Peters,20 a consideration of $180.00 paid for eighty acres of land
worth in excess of $1,600.00 where the taxes due were $455.73 was also held
to constitute a fraud on both the state and the owners of the property.
-In McAboy v. Packer,21 the title of a grantee in a "special" warranty
deed was held to be subject to an outstanding equitable right to redeem
for inadequacy of consideration paid at a tax sale under the Jones Munger
Law the same as if he had acquired title by a quitclaim deed.
In Wetmore v. Berger,22 the purchaser at an execution sale in a special
tax bill proceeding was held to have a right to maintain a cross bill to set
aside a sale under the Jones Munger Act for fraud based on inadequacy
of price. However, in De Tienne v. Peters,22a a stranger to the title who
purchased a two-thirds interest in the land for the nominal sum of $55.00
with knowledge of the prior tax sale was held not entitled to set aside
the tax sale on the ground of inadequacy of price amounting to fraud.
The case of Wetnore v. Berger,22b was distinguished upon the basis that
the purchaser in that case bought the land with a right of redemption where-
as in the De Tienne case there was no right of redemption at the time of
the purchase.
In Harrell v. Surface,23 the supreme court held that when land is sold
under an execution on a judgment for taxes in a suit to which the cestui que
18. See (1942) 8 Mo. LAw REv. 288, (1943) 9 Mo. LAw REv. 339.
19. 188 S. W. (2d) 54 (Mo. 1945).
20. 188 S. W. (2d) 954 (Mo. 1945).
21. 353 Mo. 1219, 187 S. W. (2d) 207 (1945).
22. 188 S. W. (2d) 949 (Mo. 1945).
23. 190 S. W. (2d) 939 (Mo. 1945).
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trust in a deed of trust was not a party but in which all other persons hav-
ing an interest in the land, including the trustee in the deed of trust, were
made defendants, the purchaser at the execution sale acquires a legal title
superior to that of the cestiti que trust and that the cestui merely has an
equitable right to redeem which under the facts of this case was held barred
by the defense of laches. In the case of State ex rel Wilkins v. King,24
the cestui que trust and the trustee in a deed of trust and the owner of the
land were made parties defendant in an action for delinquent taxes. Non
est returns were made and proof of service by publication was made on
the above parties. Prior to the suit the cestui had transferred his interest
in the deed of trust and the note secured thereby to another and died. The
judgment in the suit for back taxes was held not binding on the transferee
of the note and deed of trust, and the transferee was held to have a right
to redeem under the Jones Munger Law. The court carefully points out
that laches was not pleaded and has no application in this suit so there was
no question as in the Harrell case as to whether the right of the tranferee
of the note and deed of trust to redeem was lost by laches. There is no
mention made of the question as to whether the transferee will have to
maintain a suit to redeem from the execution sale in the suit for back taxes
in order to secure legal tide.
X. EXEMPTION FROM TAXATION
In the case of Salvation Army v. Hoehn,25 the supreme court held
that a former hotel purchased by the Salvation Army and used by it to
provide board and lodgings for girls and women regardless of creed, es-
pecially those of lower earning capacity, under wholesome and decent in-
fluences was exempted from taxation as property "used exclusively . . .
for purposes purely charitable" as required by Section 6 of Article X of the
Constitution of 1875 and Section 10,937 of the Missouri Revised Statutes
(1939). The foregoing phrase "used exclusively . . . for purposes purely
charitable" was readopted as part of Section 6 of Article X of the Consti-
tution of 1945 and as part of Section 10,942.420 of the Missouri Revised
Statutes Annotated. The case is interesting because the supreme court modi-
24. 189 S. W. (2d) 981 (Mo. 1945).
25. 188 S. W. (2d) 826 (Mo. 1945).
26 Mo. Laws 1945, H. C. 5, H. B. 471, § 5.
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fled the rulings in the three Y.M.C.A. cases27 to conform with its opinion in
this case.
XI. GENERAL RULES OF CONSTRUCTION




Since 1937, the tort cases involving the humanitarian doctrine have,
due to their significance to the jurisprudence of Missouri, been treated
separately by Mr. Becker at another place in this issue which annually is
devoted to a survey of the work of our supreme court. This separate
treatment has seemed desirable so that the developments in the adminis-
tration of that doctrine receive adequate emphasis. The interruption of
the war and Mr. Becker's service in the navy prevented the annual survey
of these cases for 1943 and 1944. In this issue Mr. Becker includes the
cases involving the humanitarian doctrine for those years. Special mention
is made here for his article bridges this temporary break in the treatment of
those cases.
I. NEGLIGENCE
A. Duties of persons in certain relations
1. Possessors of land
Liability was alleged in Porchey v. Kelling' for injuries suffered when
plaintiff's ward, in taking a "short-cut!' at night between two public streets
for his own convenience and to avoid the longer route around defendant's
premises via the public ways, fell into one of the grease pits on premises
owned by the defendant oil company and operated by the other defendant
as a gasoline and oil service station in Maplewood. The theory of the com-
27. State ex rel. Koeln v. St. Louis Y. M. C. A., 259 Mo. 233, 168 S. W. 589
(1914); State ex rel. St. Louis L. M. C. A. v. Gehner, 320 M.o 1172, 11 S. W. (2d)
30 (1928); and St. Louis Y. M. C. A. v. Gehner, 329 Mo. 1007, 47 S. W. (2d)
776 (1932).
28. Salvation Army v. Hoehn, 188 S. W. (2d) 826, 1. c. 829-830 (Mo. 1945)-
Construction of constitutional and statutory exemption in two prior cases was held
too strict.
*Professor of Law and Dean of the Law School, University of Missouri.
1. 353 Mo. 1034, 185 S. W. (2d) 820 (1945).
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plainant was that the defendants failed to warn the public of the danger
at night from the open and unguarded grease pits or to forbid the public
from crossing over the premises where the pits were located. The court
in affirming the ruling of the trial court in sustaining a demurrer to the
plaintiff's third amended petition, on the ground that he was at best not
more than a licensee on the premises for his own benefit, reviews again
well settled legal principles applying to the liability of a possessor of land
for injuries sustained on the land. To such persons a possessor owes no duty
except as to active or affirmative conduct on the part of the possessor. It
has long been established law in Missouri that "a bare licensee (barring
wantonness, or some form of intentional wrong or active negligence by the
owner or occupier) takes the premises as he finds them."
De Moulin v. Roetkel2 was an action against the operator of a grocery
store and its manager for injuries sustained by an employee of a packing
company when he slipped on grease in the store and fell while delivering
meat. The evidence showed that any employee who saw the grease on the
floor was supposed to clean it up and that some employee knew or was
charged with knowledge that it was on the floor for a sufficient length of
time to avoid the injury. Plaintiff joined the store company and its gen-
eral manager as defendants. The verdict of the jury exonerated the manager
while finding the store company liable in negligence. This finding was
appealed by the company as being inconsistent where the liability of the
employer falls within the rule of respondeat superior. The court on appeal
held that the legal duties of the owner of land on the one hand and the
manager on the other differ; that the liability of the employer in such
instances arises irrespective of the doctrine of respondeat superior; that the
store owner's liability falls within substantive rules of tort law as to business
invitees and does not rest upon the substantive law of agency; and that
the owners and occupiers of land cannot delegate their duty to keep the
premises in a reasonable safe condition so as to avoid personal liability.
The decision is based on an earlier case where the injury received by a cus-
tomer in a store operated by the company and managed by another re-
sulted from a defect in the doorsill." The more complete analysis of the
problem may be found in the earlier decision.
2. 189 S. W. (2d),562 (Mo. 1945).
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In Stumpf v. Panhandle Eastern Pipeline Co.,4 a foreman of the de-
fendant, a gas pipe line company, who knew of the location of the pipe
line and knew that the electric company employees setting a pole near the
pipe line used dynamite to blast obstructions encountered, gave erroneous
information as to the location of the pipe line. As a result the plaintiff,
an employee of the electric company, was injured when-escaping gas ignited
following the dynamite explosion. The defendant's evidence showed that
this foreman of the defendant's drivers knew the location of the gas pipe
lines and, in his work, if he encountered men of other utilities working along
or about these pipe lines who might be coming in contact with them, he
would investigate what they were doing, inform them of the pipe line so
as to protect it against damage, and if they were drilling a hole he would
ask whether they were going to put dynamite in it. Since the foreman should
have realized that the information, given in describing the location and
course of the pipe line, was likely to affect the conduct of the employees
of the electric company as to create an unreasonable risk of harm to those
employees, the court held that a duty was owed to exercise ordinary care
in giving this information. The analogies relied on by the court are the
situations in which there is some act on the part of the defendant which is
negligent because he realizes or should realize that it is likely to affect
the conduct of another in such a manner as to create an unreasonable risk
of harm to the plaintiff, or where it is the kind of an act which the de-
fendant realizes is likely to prevent another or a third person from taking
action necessary for the aid or protection of the other. While the outcome
of the case would be the same, it seems to the writer that a more appropriate
line of cases on which to base the decision would be those in which, instead
of an act affecting the conduct of another, information is supplied upon
which bodily security of others depends, the negligence consisting of the
failure of the one supplying the information in his business capacity to exer-
cise reasonable care to ascertain its accuracy, and bodily harm resulting
from the action taken in reliance upon such information by the recipient
of the information or by a third person to whom the giver of the informa-
tion should expect it to be communicated. Here the information had been
supplied to two fellow employees of the plaintiff, and there was testimony
4. 189 S. W. (2d) 223 (Mo. 1945).
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tending to show that this advice was later communicated to the plaintiff
by his fellow employees.'
2. Automobiles
In Brown v. Toedebuslh Transfer, Inc.,' the defendant specified two
acts of negligence, namely, failure to keep a lookout ahead, and failure to
drive as close to the right-hand side of the highway as practicable. The
sole issue of negligence submitted by the trial court to the jury was whether
the collision was caused by the defendant's truck being driven on the wrong
side of the highway. The jury found for the defendant on this issue. On
appeal, the appellant contended that error was committed by the refusal
of the court to give another instruction, offered by the plaintiff, on the
failure of the defendant to keep a lookout ahead which directly contributed
to the collision and was the proximate cause of the accident. The real
issue, according to the plaintiff's theory, being the driving of the defendant's
truck on the wrong side of the highway, the trial court was held not to
commit error in refusing to give plaintiff's instruction on the failure to
keep a proper lookout, as that was a remote cause of the collision and an
immaterial issue. "The reason for the truck being in the wrong lane,"
reasons the court, "might have been because of the failure of its driver to
keep the proper lookout. If so, such failure was not the proximate cause
of the collision but was a remote one."
Where there was evidence that defendant's bus was so damaged in
the first of two collisions with the rear end thereof by an automobile so
that it could not be removed from the highway without the aid of the tow
rope, instructions that the bus company was not negligent in leaving the
bus on the highway without a red light at the back or in failing to remove
it from the highway before the second collision with the plaintiff's car, if
the light was broken by the first collision and the bus operator had not had
sufficient time in the exercise of the highest degree of care to remove the
bus, were held in Crites v. Kansas City Public Service Co.7 not to violate
the statutory rule requiring a red tail light.
3. Railroads
In an action for personal injuries allegedly occasioned by a defective
and unsafe railroad-highway grade intersection causing the automobile
5. The opinion is based on Sections 302, 303 and 305 of the Restatement of
Torts (1934). Section 311 would seem to be the more appropriate section.
6. 190 S. W. (2d) 239 (Mo. 1945).
7. 190 S. W. (2d) 924 (Mo. 1945).
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which the plaintiff was operating to overturn, an instruction for the plaintiff
was held to constitute reversible error, in McGrew v. Thompson,8 in that
it failed to require the jury to find that the railroad had actual or construc-
tive notice of the defect in the crossing within time to make repairs before
the time of the accident alleged to have been occasioned thereby.
In Maxwell v. Kurn,9 the evidence showed that the plaintiff was the
defendant's employee in charge of a "one-man" automatic coal chute, which
was used in supplying coal to engines pulling trains transporting merchan-
dise between states, and that he was injured when he attempted to board
a car to set the brakes, while pulling by means of an electrically driven
"car puller" or winch an empty car from over the pit of the coal chute
and two loaded cars to the pit for dumping the coal into it. The cars of
coal from another state were placed on the storage track in the railroad
yards for seven to eight days as part of the railroad's reserve supply of
coal, before being moved to the coal chute for unloading and distribution
to the locomotives used principally in interestate commerce. It was held
that the plaintiff was not engaged in work directly related to interstate
transportation as to enable him to bring his action under the Federal Em-
ployers' Liability Act, as there was an interruption of the interstate journey
of these coal cars from Alabama to the defendants' coal chute for unloading,
so that the interstate character of the transportation of the coal had ended.
The court found that the coal was stored upon the defendants' tracks dur-
ing these seven or eight days under a plan intentionally to maintain a supply
of coal over and above a supply which was immediately required for use,
distinguishing this case from those where there was a temporary delay be-
cause of a lack of facilities or because the cars came in before they were
ready to use them. Nor did the fact that the coal cars were sometimes
found on tracks other than those designated for storage, or the fact that
the tracks designated for storage were occasionally used for switching move-
ments change the inference of storage. The service which the plaintiff was
performing was to be considered as merely taking the coal from storage
in the yards to a convenient place from which it could be taken as required
for use.
In an action against a railroad under the Federal Employers' Liability
8. 353 Mo. 856, 184 S. W. (2d) 994 (1945).
9. 185 S. W. (2d) 9 (Mo. 1945).
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Act, it was held, in Joice v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R. R.,10 for the jury to
say whether the railroad negligently furnished the plaintiff an unsafe place
to work, consisting of a defective motor car to be used on an uphill, ob-
scured cut and curve. The injuries were sustained by the section foreman
when his motor car, while being towed by another motor car, was struck
by an extra train. The towing was necessary since the plaintiff's motor car
did not have sufficient power to climb the hills and inclines upon the trip
ordered by the defendant."'
4. Public Accountants
An interesting question was presented on demurrer to plaintiff's third
petition in Raxsieur v. Charles, 2 involving the liability of public account-
ants for alleged negligence in preparing and auditing books and statements
made in connection with the plaintiff's income tax return, whereby the
plaintiff was wrongfully induced to sell corporate stock for the purpose
of securing an off-set against supposed taxable gain on other stock. The
defendants had represented to her that she had realized a taxable profit
resulting from the sale of shares in a designated company. This advice was
the result of the defendants incorrectly recording the proper cost of the
stock to her at a figure less than she had actually paid, with the result that
it appeared from the books and records prepared by the defendants that
the plaintiff had realized a taxable gain from the sale of the shares, when
in fact she had sustained a capital loss. The plaintiff first learned the true
facts one year later when the market value of other stock, sold at a loss for
the purpose of set-off against the represented profit, had greatly increased
10. 189 S. NV. (2d) 568 (Mo. 1945).
11. Other cases involving the liability of railroads may be noted. Mooney v.
Terminal R. R. Ass'n of St. Louis, 186 S. W. (2d) 450 (Mo. 1945), was a second
appeal on an action under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, in which the court
affirms its position in the first appeal on the question as to effect of a comparative
negligence statute on the humanitarian doctrine. The former decision is found in
352 Mo. 245, 176 S. W. (2d) 605 (1944), commented on by Parrish, Effect of a
Comparative Negligence Statute on the Hnmanitarian Doctrine (1944) 9 Mo. L.
REv. 264. In Lavender v. Kurn, 189 S. W. (2d) 253 (Mo. 1945), the plaintiff failed
to make a submissible case in an action in the Federal Employers' Liability Act
for the death of a railroad switch tender on the theory that the deceased was struck
on the head by a mail hook swinging from the side of a mail car of the defendant
railroad company. In Petty v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 191 S. W. (2d) 653
(Mo. 1945), defendant was not permitted to raise on motion for a new trial the
fact that the ordinance relied on by plaintiff and pleaded had been repealed. The
defendant had filed a general denial to the petition, but the petition did not on its
face raise the question of its validity.
12. 188 S. W. (2d) 817 (Mo. 1945).
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in value. The plaintiff contended that she was entitled to recover this differ-
ence between the November, 1940, sale price and the November, 1941,
market value, on the analogy to the New York rule of damages, applied
in cases where a broker wrongfully sells his customer's stock, which is the
highest market price of the stock between the time the customer has notice
of a sale and a reasonable time thereafter within which he could go into
the market and purchase the stock. The court, however, pointed out that
the plaintiff in the instant case knew when her stocks were sold and had
sold them herself to get a benefit permitted by the federal income tax law.
Under the same law authorizing off-set of losses on stock sales against gains
on such transactions she was permitted to repurchase the same stocks after
thirty days from the date of the sales made at a loss for such purpose. While
the defendant's negligence caused plaintiff to sell and likewise caused her
to refrain from purchasing the stocks in less than 30 days thereafter, her
failure to repurchase the stock after the thirty day period was the result
of her own choice and not of the defendant's negligence. Therefore, it was
held that the petition did state facts from which actual damage would be
found, as the plaintiff would be entitled to recover the difference between
the sales price of her stocks and the cost of replacing them within a reason-
able time after the expiration of the thirty day period.
5. Supplier of a Chattel
The negligence alleged and submitted, in Ogan v. Perkins,13 was that
defendant, who kept riding horses for hire, negligently failed to tighten the
saddle girth before delivering the horse to the plaintiff. The plaintiff had
obtained a horse from the defendant to ride on the bridle path. There was
a verdict for the defendant and a new trial was granted from which ruling
the defendant appealed. The new trial was granted on the theory that the
trial court had erred in giving instructions for the defendant which told
the jury to find for the defendant if they found that the defendant ex-
ercised ordinary care in furnishing the plaintiff with "riding equipment
known as a saddle," and "in putting the said saddle on said horse." The
plaintiff contended that there was no complaint by him that the defendant
was negligent in these particulars; instead the plaintiff's instruction bot-
tomed his case on the defendant's negligence in failing to tighten the girth,
if the girth needed tightening in order to be reasonably safe. In holding
13. 191 S. NV. (2d) 666 (Mo. 1945).
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that there was no reversible error committed in giving the defendant's
instructions, the court reasoned that "if the defendant was negligent in
failing to tighten the girth, he was negligent in 'putting the saddle on said
horse. 'In other words, the one includes the other and neither excludes the
other."
6. Employer-Employee Relationship
In an action submitted under a statute requiring employers "carrying
on any work, trade or process . . . which subjects the employee to the
danger of illness or disease incident to such work, trade or process, to which
employees are exposed" to "adopt and provide approved and effective devises,
means or methods" for the protection of such employees and "for the pre-
vention of such industrial or occupational diseases as are incident to such
work, trade or process," it was held for the jury, in Smith. v. Staizolind Pipe
Line Co.,14 whether harmful quantities of hydrogen sulphide gas existed in
sour crude oil being transported by the defendant, whether gas was present in
gatehouses in quantities sufficient to be harmful, and whether the plaintiff,
employed as a pipe line walker to inspect the gatehouses, pipe lines and equip-
ment, came in contact with harmful quantities of gas under harmful condi-
tions su cient to produce a fibrotic condition of the plaintiff's lungs and the
enlargement of his heart by inhalation of the gas. While the evidence did not
show that fibrosis of the lungs and enlargement of the heart are illnesses
which are exclusively caused by the inhalation of hydrogen sulphide gas,
nor that pipe line walkers or employees as a class were peculiarly subject
to these diseases, nor that any other pipe line walker working under the
same conditions under which the plaintiff worked had incurred these diseas-
es, it did show that the gas was poisonous and toxic and would, if inhaled
for the period and under the circumstances and time inhaled by the plaintiff
cause these diseases. The evidence was held sufficient to show that the
diseases incurred by the plaintiff were a direct result of the defendant's
failure to comply with the statute in adopting approved devices to protect
the plaintiff against diseases incident to the inhalation of gas escaping from
the sour crude oil about which he was required to work.
14. 189 S. W. (2d) 244 (Mo. 1945). The defendant contended that the stat-
ute set up no specific standard and required no specific equipment, therefore, the
common usage in other similar places, occupations and businesses, was the stand-
ard. But no usage in industry would make a device proper safety equipment under
the statute which did not make the place of work reasonably safe.
[Vol. 11
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The principal question in Greenan v. Emerson Electric Mfg. Co.)" in
an attion against the employer for an injury sustained by an employee as
a result of alleged negligence of a fellow employee, was whether the
facts showed a mere injury by a fellow servant, for which the employer would
not have been liable where both servants were engaged in the same com-
mon employment, or whether the facts showed a failure on the part of
the employer to exercise ordinary care to furnish a reasonably safe place
in which to work. The latter, held the court, depends on whether the negli-
gent act of the employee had a direct relation to the place of work or
whether it was merely incidental to the work itself. "If the instrument used
by the negligent servant is a constitutent element and a physical part of
the place in which the servant is required to work," reasons the court, "then
the negligent act of the servant is the negligence of the master." In this
case the negligent fastening by a fellow employee of a lifting device to a tur-
ret by means of a horizontal eyebolt, for the purpose of suspending the
turret o'ver the fixture to which it was to be attached and at which the
injured employee was required to work, related to the safety of the injured
employee's place to work, and the employer was liable for the negligence
of the fellow employee in making a bad hookup which resulted in the turret
dropping down and catching the hand of the injured employee. The court
distinguished this situation from other cases "where the injured servant
and the negligent servant 'are so associated and related in the performance
of their work that they can observe and influence each other's conduct and
report any delinquency to a correcting power.'"
B. Inputed negligence
Imputed negligence is raised in an interesting fashion in Cooper v.
Standard Steel Works,' where, on the question of contributory negligence,
the case turns on whether the jury should be instructed that the plaintiff was
required to exercise ordinary care or whether his duty was to exercise
the highest degree of care. This depended on whether there was substantial
evidence from which the jury could find that he had authority to control
the movements of the truck, in which he was riding at the time of the
collision with the defendant's truck, so that the driver's negligence could
be imputed to him. The plaintiff was an employee of a company engaged
15. 191 S. W. (2d) 646 (Mo. 1945).
16. 190 S. W. (2d) 237 (Mo. 1945).
61
et al.: Work of the Missouri Supreme Court 1945
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1946
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
in the business of transporting money for different companies and corpora-
tions to different banks for deposit. The plaintiff accompanied the truck
and was in charge of the transportation and delivery of the money to the
banks. At the time of the collision the plaintiff, as usual, was seated beside
the driver of the truck who was also employed by the same company,
The trial court had instructed the jury that the plaintiff was required
only to use ordinary care. There was a verdict for the plaintiff. The trial
court granted defendant's motion for a new trial from which judgment
plaintiff appealed. The supreme court held that there was sufficient evi-
dence from which the jury could find that the plaintiff had authority to
control the movements of the truck on which he was riding and, should the
jury so find, the instruction on ordinary care would be erroneous because
the negligence of the driver of the truck whose duty under the statute is
to exercise the highest degree of care would, therefore, be imputed to the
plaintiff.
C. Defenses in negligence cases
In State ex. rel. Kansas City Public Service Co. v. Bland'7 a truck driver,
in looking through the window of another parked truck before pulling
away from a loading dock, saw the defendant's street car approaching 160
feet away. He drove on the street car track 35 feet away, where the collision
occurred, without again looking after passing beyond the parked truck. There
was no evidence that he had any knowledge of or relied upon any custom
of street cars maintaining a speed not in excess of 10 miles per hour at that
point. The Kansas City Court of Appeals held under these facts that the
driver was not guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law, as
reasonable minds may differ on whether plaintiff could have relied upon a
slower rate of speed. While recognizing the general rule that one approach-
ing a railroad or street car track, who is unable to see whether' he can pass
over the crossing in safety, must continue to look until he can see even to
the crossing, ordinary care does not require the traveler constantly to look
and listen at all points of his approach to the crossing and while upon the
track. "If he looks and sees no car approaching," said the intermediate
court, "he should not be held guilty of negligence, as a matter of law, in
attempting to cross, if, in view of the distance for which the track appears
to be clear, he would have time to cross before a train or car going at the,
17. 188 S. NV. (2d) 650 (Mo. 1945).
[Vol. 11
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-sual and lawful rate of speed would reach the crossing." (Italics the re-
spondents.) In considering whether the intermediate court applied these
facts a different rule of law from that applied by the supreme court, in that
such conduct did not constitute contributory negligence as a matter of law,
the decision was held to turn upon whether the plaintiff in the exercise of
the highest degree of care had the right to rely upon defendant's compliance
with a custom and practice (the usual rate of speed of the defendant's street
cars) of which the plaintiff knew nothing. It was held that "knowledge of and
reliance on the alleged customary or usual speed were both essential to ex-
cuse plaintiff's conduct under the facts stated in the respondent's opinion, or
to make an issue for the jury concerning whether the plaintiff exercisesd
the highest degree of care under the circumstances." There being no such
evidence, the facts brought the case within the rule of law previously laid
down by the highest court which makes the plaintiff contributorily negligent
as a matter of law, the decision therefore conflicting with the previous de-
cisions. Said the court: "Plaintiff, therefore, took a chance that no street
car was immediately approaching beyond his view at a speed in excess
of 10 miles per hour, the operator would see plaintiff in time and be able
to stop and avoid a collision. Plaintiff was driving slowly and, if he had
looked when he cleared the obstruction, he could have seen the approaching
street car in time to have stopped before going upon the track." Three
judges dissented on the ground that there were facts from which an inference
could be drawn that the plaintiff knew of slow orders at that point and
rightfully expected the street car to approach at a reduced speed.
An instruction on contributory negligence was held to be prejudicially
erroneous in Stumpf v. Panhandle Eastern Pipeline Co.,"' in that the instruc-
tion directed verdicts for the defendants if the hypothesized facts setting up
contributory negligence "caused or contributed to cause plaintiff's injury."
The court held that under the facts it was not sufficient that the plaintiff's
negligence was a contributing cause but for which the injury would not
have been sustained, but his negligence must have been a proximate cause
as the term is used which "may reasonably be regarded as a direct, producing
or efficient cause; or as entering into and forming a part of the direct, pro-
ducing or efficient cause of the injury." The instruction submitted the
question of whether the plaintiff's negligence was an actual cause or a cause
18. 189 S. NV. (2d) 223 (Mo. 1945).
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in fact, in the sense that but for which the injury would not have been
sustained, but to constitute a legally contributing cause or a cause in law
of the harm it is necessary that the plaintiff's negligence be a "susbtantial
factor in bringing it about."' 9 The court recognized that under certain sets
of circumstances, negligent acts, in the nature of things, necessarily contri-
bute directly to cause the injury and necessarily formed a part of the
efficient cause thereof. Such an instruction would not be held erroneous
just because it did not require the jury to draw the inference which the law
itself would draw therefrom. The cases referred to are those "where the
hypothesized negilgent acts of plaintiff permit no reasonable inference but
the inference that the negligence was a direct, producing or efficient cause
of the casualty." In the instant case the contributory negligence asserted
by the defendant consisted of placing a charge of dynamite in proximity to
the defendant's pipe line. If the jury found the fact that the defendant had
by his statements negligently misled the plaintiff as to the location of the
pipe line, such negligence of the defendants could have been reasonably be-
lieved by the jury to have been "the direct, producing or efficient cause of
the plaintiff's injury" and that the negligence of the plaintiff was not a
cause which reasonably should be regarded as "a direct, producing or efficient
cause for which the plaintiff should be considered legally responsible."20
The same instruction was erroneous in another respect since the jury
was advised that "persons engaged in the discharge of dynamite or other
explosives are under a duty to exercise suck care as a very prudent mam would
exercise in carrying sutch, work . . ." (Italics the court's.) While it is true
that ordinary care is a relative term, and its exercise requires precautions
commensurate with the dangers reasonably to be anticipated under the
circumstances, the care which the ordinarily prudent man must exercise
to be free from negligence is quite different from that of a very prudent man.
The latter is a distinctly higher standard of care.
19. RESTATEMENT OF ToRTs (1934) §§ 430, 431, 465.
20. Plaintiff's instruction in Petty v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 191 S. W.
(2d) 653 (Mo. 1945), instructed the jury that "because of the tender age of the
plaintiff that she cannot be charged with contributory negligence; so therefore you
are further instructed . . ." There being no issue of contributory negligence in
the case, the defendant contended that, by this part of the insrtuction, the court
impliedly directed a verdict for the plaintiff inasmuch as the term, contributory
negligence, necessarily presupposes negligence of the defendant. While the court
recognized that the quoted language was unnecessary and argumentative, it was
not so prejudicial as to require a reversal.
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D. Burden of Proof
In spite of a constantly growing list of cases in which the court has
condemned an instruction on the burden of proof which instructs the jury
that the plaintiff must sustain his case to the satisfaction or to the reasonable
satisfaction of the jury, lawyers and trial jidges are continuing to use the
phrases. This annual survey has repeatedly called the bar's attention to the
efforts of the court to provide a standardized instruction on the burden
of proof in the negligence cases. 21 In Stumpf v. Panhandle Eastern Pipeline
Co.,22 the court again cautions against the use of such expressions. In a
case decided in the preceding year, Johnson v. Dawidoff,23 the court cited
the previous decisions disclosing the trend of the recent opinions and said:
"A reading of them will also show that Missouri is one of few states in
which such an instruction has been tolerated. It is certain, in view of what
we have said, that if a trial court should grant a new trial and assign as a
reason therefor the giving of such instruction this court will sustain the
ruling. We will not hazard to speculate on how soon Missouri will join the
majority of the jurisdictions, condemning such instruction as casting a greater
burden on a plaintiff than should be required under the law."
II. LIBEL AND SLANDER
Interesting questions as to the scope of the defense of absolute privilege
to an action based upon libel for defamatory statements made in defendant
insurance companies' motion for a new trial, supported by a neuro-psy-
chiatrist's affidavit who was also made party defendant, were raised in Hager
v. Major.24 The plaintiff had testified as a witness in a certain cause in the
United States District Court wherein the four defendant insurance com-
panies were the plaintiffs. The purpose of the prior suit was to obtain a
declaratory judgment that the four insurance companies were not liable for
loss under certain fire insurance policies issued to certain parties who were
the defendants in that suit, on the theory that the insured had caused the
insured property to be destroyed by fire. Two of the four insurance com-
panies had issued policies for $3,500 each, and the other two companies had
issued policies for $2,500 each. The court in that proceeding dismissed the
21. The annual surveys beginning in 1937 to the present have noted the
steady condemnation.
22. 189 S. W. (2d) 223 (Mo. 1945).
23. 352 Mo. 343, 177 S. W. (2d) 467 (1944).
24. 353 Mo. 1166, 186 S. W. (2d) 564 (1945). 65
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suit as to the latter two companies on the ground that the amount involved
was not sufficient to give jurisdiction of the subject matter to the federal
court; as to the first two insurance companies the court denied the declara-
tory judgment and gave judgment on the insured's counterclaim. The four
companies joined in a motion to set aside the order of dismissal for lack of
jurisdiction as to the two and for a new trial as to the other two. This motion
is referred to in the libel suit as the motion for a new trial. In support of
the motion the affidavit by the defendant Major, a neuro-psychiatrist, was
filed which expressed the opinion that the plaintiff, who had testified in the
earlier proceedings, was "a case of psychopathic personality (pathological
liar), whose judgments and statements should be considered absolutely un-
reliable and undependable." It is also stated that "from the affidavits it is
clearly seen that she is emotionally unstable, has a vivid imagination and is
what might be called a typical fanatic and person who is constantly trying
to put herself in the limelight, and he is of the opinion that no court would
be justified in accepting her testimony in any cause because of her mental
condition." In the motion for a new trial the insurance companies alleged,
according to the plaintiff's petition in the libel suit, that she "is a professional
busybody, notoriety seeker, with a penchant for litigation; that she poses
as a social worker in such cases, when, in reality, she represents no one but
herself, . . . that in order to gain notoriety she wrote and mailed certain
threatening letters to herself .....
The various defendants filed separate demurrers to the petition on the
ground of absolute privilege. The plaintiff denied the availability of this
defense, contending in any event that the defendant Major could not claim
the defense because he was not a party to the federal court case, and the two
insurance companies whose policies were only $2,500 each could not claim
absolute privilege because the federal district court was without jurisdiction
of the subject matter as to these companies. The trial court sustained the
separate demurrers to the plaintiff's petition. On appeal the supreme court
ruled that the defamatory allegations, made in the motion for a new trial
by the two insurance companies seeking to absolve themselves from liability
for loss under the two $3,500 fire insurance policies, were absolutely privileged
since the federal court had jurisdiction of the subject matter and the de-
famatory statements made in the due course of a legal proceedings were
relevant to the issues. As to the other two insurance compnies whose policies
were only $2,500 each, the defamatory statements could not be pertinent
[Vol. 11
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and relevant to the issues before the court since the federal court did not
have jurisdiction of the subject matter. As to the affidavit made by the
defendant Major which was filed in support of the motion for a new trial,
the court held it fell with the rule that pertinent matter in pleadings, motions,
affidavits, and other papers filed in a civil case before a court having juris-
diction of the premises was absolutely privileged, though false and malicious.
The issue in the motion for a new trial in the federal court case, so far
as concerned the affidavit of the defendant Major, was the alleged false
swearing by the plaintiff here. Thus the affidavit was relevant and pertinent
to the issue. On this point the court distinguished Laun v. Uniom Electric
Co.,25 where the defendants in the libel suit had furnished to the plaintiff in
an earlier federal suit the information upon which the suit was based. In
that case the defense of absolute privilege was daimed by the defendants on
the ground that they were holding companies or otherwise owned and con-
trolled the companies which had filed the earlier suit containing the defama-
tory matters, and were parties interested in, though not actual parties to
the suit. The court denied them the defense of absolute privilege as they
were not parties or pleaders.
In Kirk v. Ebenhocl&,28 the plaintiff alleged that she, her stepdaughter
and a third woman whose hair was red were the only women residing in
plaintiff's home; that the defendants in the home of the plaintiff stated in
the presence of others that "These women and the redhead have soldiers
running in and out day and night . . ."; and that the defendant further
accused the plaintiff of operating a house of prostitution. The trial court
had sustained defendant's demurrer to the petition apparently on the
ground that the words charged the plaintiff with operating a house of
prostitution, which was punishable by fine only, and therefore the words
spoken were not actionable without alleging special damage. On appeal
it was held that the words alleged to have been spoken by the defendants
also imputed unchastity to the plaintiff and were therefore actionable under
the statute without alleging special damages.
25. 350 Mo. 572, 166 S. W. (2d) 1065 (1942).
26. 191 S. W. (2d) 643 (Mo. 1945). 67
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TRUSTS, WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION
GEORGE W. SIMPKINS O
Because of the difficulty of separating the two fields, wills and trusts
are combined this year. The problems of their construction are closely
interrelated and will be treated together. Cases on the probate administra-
tion of decedent's estates will also be considered, but not those dealing with
guardianships.
1. Cases Involving the Administration of Estates.
The action of a probate court in granting letters of administration
on the stated ground that the decedent was a resident of the county can
only be reviewed by appeal. It cannot be attacked by a motion alleging
that the decedent was a resident of some other county for the reason that
such a motion is unauthoriezd. It is not a writ of error coram nobis, since
such writ cannot be used to attack an error in the record but only to obtain
relief which is not inconsistent with the recorded findings.'
In State ex rel. Bostian v. Ridge,2 the court held that a motion under
Section 211 (R. S. Mo. 1939) (allowing an executor, administrator, heir or
creditor of an estate to file a motion at any time within four months after
a claim is allowed to set aside the allowance on the ground that the claim
has been "improperly allowed") could be based on a charge of collusion
between the claimant and the administrator and is not limited to cases where
a claim has been allowed by default. It was further held that no appeal
could be prosecuted to the circuit court from an order of the probate court
refusing to order payment of such a claim pending the disposition of such
motion.
Through the use of straw parties and the concealment of the facts from
the court, an administrator had obtained the approval of a sale of real estate
of the decedent to a creditor of decedent who later quitclaimed it to the
administrator. Such a sale was held wholly void under the express terms of
Section 161 (R. S. Mo. 1939). It could properly be attacked by a suit to
set aside the several deeds.'
*Attorney, St Louis, A.B. Harvard, 1930; J.D. Washington University, 1933.
1. In re Sheldon's Estate, Fakes v. Hammons, 189 S. W. (2d) 235 (Mo.
1945).
2. 188 S. W. (2d) 941 (Mo. 1945).
3. Wortham v. Marten, 188 S. NV. (2d) 11 (Mo. 1945).
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2. Mental Incompetency and Undue Influence.
Only one case involving testamentary capacity was decided during the
year. In it, the court followed the well established rule that testimony
of lay witnesses not based on facts is not sufficient to create a submissable
case. A doctor's testimony was held insufficient in that he could only
testify that deceased was incompetent "most" of the time, but was rational
at intervals."
In Welch v. Welch.' a will was set aside because of undue influence
found by the court to have been established by substantial evidence. Al-
though the case of Bakewell v. Clemens" (involving the validity of a trust)
is not primarily decided on this ground, it is of interest in its dicta to the
effect that the mere fact that a trustee was the attorney for the settlor of
a trust is not sufficient to raise a presumption of undue influence. It also
holds that a valid trust as to corporate stock can be created without the
simultaneous physical delivery of the stock certificates, if the trust pur-
ports to convey title and stock transfer forms are executed.
3. Construction of Wills and Trusts
In St. Louis Union Trust Company v. KaltenbachlY testator had left
his residuary estate to his wife and his four children, providing, however,
that the share of an afflicted daughter should be held in trust for her and
on her death without children "her estate to descend to next nearest of
kin." The court followed the Restatement of the Law of Property (Sections
307 and 308) in rejecting the conflicting views held by many jurisdictions
and ruling that the phrase "next of kin" means those who under local law
would be entitled to succeed to the personal property of the designated
ancestor and that the members of such class are to be determined at the
time of the death of the ancestor unless some other intent clearly appears.
Here it was held that the children of testator were meant by the phrase
and that each took a vested estate subject to be divested if the daughter
should die leaving children. Such estate descended to the children of any
child of testator who died before his daughter. The case is also of interest
for its determination that adoption under the California statutes did not
4. Smith v. Fitzjohn, 188 S. W. (2d) 832 (Mo. 1945).
5. 190 S. W. (2d) 936 (Mo. 1945).
6. 190 S. W. (2d) 912 (Mo. 1945).
7. 353 Mo. 1114, 186 S. W. (2d) 578 (1945). 69
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bar a child from inheriting from his natural parent, intimating that the
same result would follow under the present Missouri statutes.
Under a will giving testator's grandson a life interest of $1,000.00 per
annum in the trust income, which interest was forfeited because of the
grandson's attempted assignment of his interest contrary to the express
forfeiture provisions of the will, and providing that after the grandson's
death, the trustee should continue to hold the fund until the grandson's
issue reached majority, such issue on reaching majority was entitled to the
entire income even though the grandson was still alive.8
In Dodd v. McGee9 the will clearly created successive life estates. It
was held that this could legally be done in Missouri despite the provisions
of Section 3504 (R. S. Mo. 1939) that "every interest in real estate granted
or devised to two or more persons, other than executors and trustees and
husband and wife, shall be a tenancy in common" unless expressly declared
to be a joint tenancy.
The great care necessary in drafting judgments in will construction
cases so as not to affect adversely the rights of parties who are not partici-
pants in the main dispute was illustrated in two cases. In another appeal
involving the will of John F. Liggett the provisions of the decree of the
circuit court rendered in earlier litigation had been held to be erroneous 1
Nevertheless such erroneous decree wa sheld binding as res judicata
against a defendant therein who was of age, but took no part in the prior
litigation.1 This is true even though the judgment had been held not
binding on a minor defendant on the ground that her guardian in assenting
to such decree had exceeded his authority and acted in a manner detrimental
to her interests.' 2 However, mere dicta in the opinion of the supreme court
in an earlier case involving the construction of the same will cannot be held
to be res judicata as to the rights of parties whose existence was un-
known to the court at said time."3
Of especial interest to attorneys are the decisions of the supreme court
in three cases involving the power of a court to award attorney's fees to
counsel out of the corpus of trust estates where the instrument creating the
8. Garrison v. Garrison, 188 S. W. (2d) 644 (Mo. 1945).
9. 190 S. W. (2d) 231 (Mo. 1945).
10. Kennard v. Wiggins, 349 Mo. 283, 160 S. W. (2d) 706 (1941).
11. McIntosh v. Wiggins, 191 S. W. (2d) 637 (Mo. 1945).
12. Kennard v. Wiggins, 349 Mo. 283, 160 S. W. (2d) 706 (1941).
13. Garrison v. Garrison, 188 S. W. (2d) 644 (Mo. 1945).
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same is being construed by the court. In a controversy involving whether
income should be paid out or accumulated, it was held that attorney's fees
to the attorney for the successful claimant of such income and the attorney
for two contingent beneficiaries should be paid out of the corpus of the
estate.1 4 However, where the controversy was as to distribution of the
corpus of the trust upon its termination, it was held that each successful
claimant should pay his attorney out of his own share and that the fees
should not both be charged against the corpus prior to distribution. This
was true even though one claimant was a minor represented by a guardian
ad litem, the court indicating that if the guardian had not been successful
in obtaining at least some property for the ward, then the guardian and his
attorney could be allowed fees out of the corpus.15 Finally, in the litiga-
tion involving the Hazlett Campbell trust, it was held that the trial judge
could not impose on the trust estate fees of an attorney representing the
trial judge in defending mandamus suits brought to compel the judge to
grant appeals from his decision as to who were the beneficiaries of the trust.16
4. Miscellaneous Cases Involving Wills.
Two cases involving the effect of the probate of wills as to real estate
render more difficult the task of the lawyer examining title. In Fountain
v. Fountain17 it was held that a three year delay in probating a will did not
affect the validity or effect of the will where there were no prior letters
testamentary or administration to start the running of the statute' 8 requiring
the probate of a will within one year after the first publication of notice of
the granting of letters testamentary or of administration. In Mizell v.
Osmon,,9 the supreme court ruled that the statute20 requiring a will to be
recorded in the recorder's office did not affect the admissibility in evidence
of a will which was duly probated but not so recorded. It is thus necessary
to examine the probate court records of the county of residence of the
deceased owner as well as the records of the county where the land is.
The common law rule of revocation of a specific devise by sale of the
land prior to the death of testator was held applicable to a sale to a federal
14. Garrison v. Garrison, 188 S. W. (2d) 644 (Mo. 1945).
15. St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Fitch, 190 S. W. (2d) 215 (Mo. 1945).
16. St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Fitch, 190 S. W. (2d) 215 (Mo. 1945).
17. 190 S. W. (2d) 941 (Mo. 1945).
18. Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) § 532.
19. 189 S. W. (2d) 306 (Mo. 1945).
20. Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) § 549. 71
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agency which had indicated that it would condemn the land if not sold
to it. However, in the particular case relief was granted to the disappointed
devisee by granting specific performance of a contract to devise to him the
first farm and holding that the proceeds thereof were traceable into a sub-
sequently acquired farm."
In Manufacturers Bank & Trust Co. v. Kunda,22 the court refused to
follow earlier dicta to the contrary,23 and held that a widow is bound in
equity to elect whether to take under a will disposing of all of the testator's
personal property or to take her statutory rights. The case further reiterates
the prior ruling24 that where such widow is insane, the election is to be made
by a court of equity considering solely the widow's own interests and the
amounts needed for her comfortable support and not the interests of lier
heirs who might be benefited if the election was made on a basis of merely
monetary considerations.
5. Miscellaneous Cases Involving Trusts.
In Lewis v. Lewis, 2 a husband and wife were having marital difficulties.
During these negotiations the husband transferred certain insurance policies
and corporate stock certificates to his wife for the purpose of her creating
a trust for his minor children. She did not do so. After weighing the dis-
puted evidence of the facts, the court ordered the transfers of the property
to the wife set aside and all the property revested in the husband.
In the case of In re Collins' Trust Estate,2 it was held that the some-
what broad language of an order selling the remaining assets of an in-
solvent bank in liquidation did not appoint the purchaser trustee under a
deed of trust securing certain of the notes purchased by him.
21. Beffa v. Peterein, 191 S. W. (2d) 633 (Mo. 1945).
22. 353 Mo. 870, 185 S. W. (2d) 13 (1945).
23. Nies v. Stone, 232 Mo. App. 1226, 117 S. W. (2d) 407 (1938); Egger v.
Egger, 225 Mo. 116, 123 S. W. 928 (1910).
24. In re Estate of Connor, 254 Mo. 65, 162 S. W. 252 (1914).
25. 189 S. W. (2d) 557 (Mo. 1945).
26. 190 S. W. (2d) 259 (Mo. 1945).
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THE NEW GENERAL CODE FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE
INTERPRETED"
CARL C. WHEATON*
This article presents the interpretations by courts of our General Code
for Civil Procedure (hereafter referred to as "the code") which was known
as Senate Bill 34, and which became effective on January 1, 1945, and is
found on pages 353 through 397 of the 1943 Laws of Missouri.
OBJECTIVES OF CODE
The primary objectives of the code are to simplify legal procedure;
to expedite trials and appellate reviews; and to lessen the expense of litiga-
tion-all to the end that substantial justice will be done between parties
litigant. The number of cases that were formerly disposed of on technicali-
ties is to be reduced; the merits of a case are to be passed upon and reviewed.
By the speeding up of trials and review, and by the lessening of expense
of litigation, bench and bar will more nearly and more efficiently fulfill their
high responsibilities, and a more extensive use of the judicial process will
be enjoyed by the people.2
Its aim is to determine what are the controversial issues before the
trial begins, and limit the trial to them.3
Technicalities in pleadings are not to be used to conceal issues and
to ambush an adverse party, thereby depriving him of the just adjudication
of his case on the merits.4
If a pleader cannot state a claim or legal defense after he has had
opportunity to discover the actual facts and amend, substantial justice would
not be served by permitting a pleader nevertheless to avail himself of trial
procedure.5
A federal district judge sitting in Missouri has said that the purpose
of the code is to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of
*Professor of Law, University of Missouri, A.B., 1911, Leland Stanford Univer-
sity, LL.B., 1915, Harvard University. Draftsman for the Missouri Supreme Court
Committee on Civil Practice and Procedure.
1. This intepretation is based on cases reported in volumes 185 through 195
of Southwestern Reporter, Second Series, and on a few decisions of federal courts
published prior to October 1, 1946.
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every action by the simplification of practice so as to permit advancement of
a cause to a decision on its merits with a minimum of procedural encum-
brances.6
SERVICE OF PAPERS
Subsection (a) of Section 5 of the code requires the service of an
amended petition to be made upon the defendant or his attorney of record.
Under subsection (b) thereof, such service can be made upon an attorney
of record, and under subsection (d) the time of serving said amended peti-
tion on the opposite party may be either before, or within five days after,
the amended petition is filed with the court.
In one case an amended petition was served upon the attorney of
record for defendant on the afternoon of the day that an amendment was
made. At the time the amendment was actually made the defendant had
no attorney of record, but within five days thereafter, and before the time
the defendant was required to plead in said action, the defendant did have
an attorney of record. The appearance of said attorney was entered of
record when he filed and presented to the state court an application and
petition for removal. Service of the amended petition upon the attorney
of record for defendant, at the time of the hearing on the application and
petition for removal of this cause, was held to be a sufficient compliance with
Section 5.7
FILING OF PAPERS
The receipt by a special judge of an entry of appearance and answer
for the purpose of filing is irregular but does not deprive the court of
jurisdiction to enter judgment.8
EXTENDING THE TIME FOR DOING
SPECIFIED ACTS
In the case of Clader v. City of Neos"o,9 the supreme court considered
Sections 6(b), 135, 137, and 138 of the code and its Rules 1.30 and 3.26.
In that case the defendant's attorney filed its transcript on appeal with the
6. Johnson v. Walsh, 65 F. Supp. 157 (W. D. Mo. 1946).
7. Johnson v. Walsh, 65 F. Supp. 157 (W. D. Mo. 1946). In Johnson v.
Walsh, at page 160, it was said that constructions given federal rules were persuasive
in the construction of provisions of our new civil procedure code which are pat-
terned after the federal rules.
8. State ex rel. Green v. James, 195 S. W. (2d) 669 (Mo. 1946).
9. 193 S. W. (2d) 620 (Mo. 1946). This was a review of the case of Clader
v. City of Neosho, 192 S. NV. (2d) 508 (Mo. App. 1946).
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clerk of the circuit one day before it had to be filed in the court of appeals,
and about five months after the filing of the notice of appeal. The tran-
script was eight days late in reaching the clerk of the court of appeals,
since the clerk of the trial court failed to remit at once as he thought that
the judge's certificate on the transcript was not properly worded. The clerk
did not for several days notify the defendant's counsel of his failure to send
the transcript to the appellate court. As soon as the attorney was notified
of this fact, he got the transcript and had the trial judge Amend his certi-
ficate and the transcript was filed in the court of appeals. That court dis-
missed the appeal on the grounds that subdivision (b) of Section 6 of the
code requires an application for an extension of time in which to file a'
transcript to be made before the expiration of the time previously given to
file it and that only the trial judge may extend the time.
The supreme court held that this was a mistaken view of the law. It
decided that, though an appellate court can grant further time for filing
a transcript, it should not be necessary for it to do so until after the
expiration of six months from the date notice of appeal was filed in the trial
court, since the court under Supreme Court Rule 3.26 has authority to
make extensions during that period.
In this case when counsel for appellant was notified of the clerk's failure
to send the transcript to the court of appeals because of an alleged ir-
regularity in the judge's certificate, the proper procedure was to file a
motion in the trial court for a further extension of time and to obtain an
amended certificate from the trial judge.
Where the court of appeals found that the appellant had shown good
cause for a short delay in filing the transcript of record occasioned by the
circuit clerk's idea that the judge's certificate to the transcript was not
properly worded, upon the filing of a motion for extension of time in which
to file the transcript, it should have enlarged that time, though the motion
was made after the time allowed by the trial court to file the transcript had
expired. The cause was therefore retransferred to the court of appeals.
The court further held that the purpose of Supreme Court Rules 1.30
and 3.26 pertaining to the enlargement of time is to expedite appeals by
preventing them from lying dormant in a trial court and to let the appellate
court know what cases in which notices of appeal have been filed are li'e
cases in which the appellant actually intends to perfect his appeal.
It added that the practice of the supreme court, after the six months'
75
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period during which the trial court may grant extensions for filing of a
transcript have elapsed, is to put cases in which no application for further
extension has been made on the next hearing docket and dismiss them for
failure to comply with the rules, if there is no further application for en-
largement of time and showing of good cause therefor. Hence, an appeal
was dismissed where more than 90 days had elapsed from the date of
the filing of the defendant's notice of appeal until the date of the filing of
the transcript in the court of appeals, no request for an extension of time
was made to or granted by the trial court, and the defendant did not apply
to the appellate court for the granting of further time, for good cause
shown, and none was granted as provided by rule 1.30 of the latter court.10
PARTIES
Where a life policy providing for permanent total disability benefits
was taken out with a partnership as beneficiary and a member of the
partnership as the insured, and the application and riders attached to the
policy provided that all benefits derived from the policy should belong to
the beneficiary, the insured could not sue, as an individual, for disability
benefits without joining other members of the partnership or accounting
for her failure to do so.
The reason given for this conclusion was that, though she had an in-
terest as a partner, she could not sue as an individual on a partnership claim.
She could make a claim only as a surviving or liquidating partner, or as an
assignee of the partnership, and she did not so sue.
Section 17 of the code which provides that misjoinder is not ground
for dismissal does not apply under these circumstances since they relate to
a non-joinder which is in violation of Section 15.11
SETTING FoRTH CLAIMS FOR RELIEF
Under Section 36 of the code a plaintiff must generally allege the ulti-
mate facts wbich must be proven in order to entitle him to recover.1 2
In determining whether a petition states facts showing that pleader
is entitled to relief, a court must consider the petition as a whole, with
all of its several allegations, but it may disregard general allegations which
10. School District No. 24 v. Mease, 193 S. W. (2d) 513 (Mo. App. 1946).
11. Barnett v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America, 194 S. W. (2d) 317
(Mo. App. 1946).
12. Devault v. Truman, 194 S. W. (2d) 29 (Mo. 1946).
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are disproven by specific allegations and the construction of the petition
must be such as to do substantial justice." And if the allegations of a
petition are mutually contradictory and self-destructive, no cause of action
is stated. 14
NECESSITY OF PLEADING NEGLIGENCE
Notwithstanding the wording of Section 40 of the code, if the plaintiff's
evidence conclusively shows that he was guilty of contributory negligence,
plaintiff can not recover although the defendant may not have affirmatively
pleaded contributory negligence.' 5
EXHIBITS ARE PARTS OF A PLEADING
Under Section 44 of the code a life policy attached to a petition as
an exhibit formed a part of the pleadings.'6
PROPER METHOD OF ATTACKING NON-JOINDER OF PARTIES
Under Section 61 the proper method of reaching the defect of non-
joinder of parties is by motion.17
MOTIONS TO DISMISS PETITION
Whether a trial court errs in sustaining motions to dismiss depends
upon whether the petition contains a "statement of the facts showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief.""'
If it clearly appears from the facts of the petition that plaintiff's cause
of action, if any, is barred by the applicable statutes of limitation, a motion
to dismiss is properly sustained.' 9
WAIVER OF OBJECTIONS BY FAILURE TO MAKE MOTION
The phrase "the failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted," as used in Section 66 of the code providing that a party waives all
objections then available to him by motion by failure to assert them by
motion within the time limited by Section 65, except failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted, means the same as the phrase,
"failure to state a cause of action," as formerly understood.20
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. Gerber v. Schutte Investment Co., 194 S. W. (2d) 25 (Mo. 1946).
16. Barnett v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America, 194 S. W. (2d) 317
(Mo. App. 1946).
17. Ibid.
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AMENDMENTS TO PLEADINGS
The right to amend, as of course, is distinct from the right to amend
by leave of court, and it is a right which is conferred on parties equally with
that of pleading originally and of it a party cannot be deprived by a court.2'
Where a statute or rule provides that a pleading may be amended as
of course, it may be so amended without application to the court, or
permission therefrom, on compliance with conditions, if any, imposed
by the statute or rule.22
Therefore, under Section 81 of the code, regarding the amendment
of pleadings and the service thereof, where a responsive pleading has not been
filed and served at the time the plaintiff files an amendment, the plaintiff
is not required to obtain leave of court to amend the petition, and it is
not necessary for plaintiff to file a written application in form of a motion
seeking leave of court to make said amendment. 23
The purpose of the procedural statutes would not be consummated by
sustaining a motion to dismiss a petition with prejudice or by rendition
of judgment for the plaintiff on the ground that the defendant had failed
to state a legal defense, where the pleader has not been allowed a reasonable
time or opportunity to amend or to avail himself of other procedure pro-
vided by statutes, if necessary, for ascertaining the actual facts which would
enable him to amend and state a claim or defense.2 4
Further, the procedural action, provided by the code, which is taken
or allowed in the furtherance of the code's primary objectives, and the
reasonableness of the time or opportunity allowed a pleader to avail him-
self of the code's procedure are peculiarly within the trial court's discretion-
ary province; and the court's action (except it be arbitrary) in the futherance
of such objectives will not be disturbed.2 5
PRE-TRIAL PROCEDURE
The purpose of Supreme Court Rule 3.17 regarding pre-trial procedure
and of an order under it is to eliminate the doing of useless things. Hence,
when parties, through their attorneys, come before a court for a pre-trial
hearing and an admission or agreement as to factual issue is made and
21. Johnson v. Walsh, 65 F. Supp. 157 (W. D. Mo. 1946).
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid.
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carried into effect by order of a court, unless the order is modified there-
after by court, the issue stands as fully determined as if adjudicated after
taking of testimony.
Also, an admission in a pre-trial hearing is in substitution for proof
and is in substitution of jurisdictional facts alleged in the petition.
And where the transcript of the record approved by counsel and signed
by the trial judge contained a pre-trial order stating that the parties agreed
that the amount in controversy was $5,000 the parties were bound by the
agreement.2 6
INTERROGATORIES
It was held in the important case of State ex rel. Williams v. Buzard'7
that, under Section 85 of the code, one may put interrogatories only to
the extent that questions could be put in depositions. Hence, one can not
ask an interrogatory requesting a street car company involved in an accident
to state the names and addresses of all persons whose names and addresses
were taken by any employee at the scene of the casualty, for such a question
calls for the names of those whom any employee of the defendant may have
found at the scene of the accident after it occurred or who were identified with
the accident by hearsay only. Interrogatories which are to be answered by
someone for a corporation are directed to the corporation. Service of the in-
terrogatories on one representing a corporation is authorized because a corpo-
ration has to be reached by service or some individual must be responsible for
making an answer. Hence, the fact that an individual who is not present at an
occurrence is asked to answer interrogatories for a company does not make
inapplicable the rule that interrogatories should not cover facts which are
hearsay to the person from whom the person answering the interrogatories
gets the information on which to base his answers.
In accordance with this decision, the supreme court later held in State ex
rel. Thompson v. Harris2'8 that written statements obtained by a railroad
from an injured motorist and other occupants of an automobile several days
after a collision were hearsay and admissible in a personal injury suit against
the railroad only if they were offered by the railroad for the purpose of
impeachment. Hence, the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction in ordering the
railroad to answer interrogatories inquiring whether such statements were
26. Wagner v. Mederacke, 192 S. W. (2d) 865 (Mo. 1946).
27. 190 S. W. (2d) 907 (Mo. 1945).
28. 195 S. W. (2d) 645 (Mo. 1946).
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obtained and in requesting that a copy of such statements be attached
to interrogatories. It held further that to authorize a court to compel pro-
duction of documents at the instance of an adverse party, such documents
must contain evidence which is relevant and material to the merits of the
case, for the new code of civil procedure does not, either expressly or by im-
plication, authorize production of documents or copies thereof either in
court, on deposition, or on interrogatories, where such documents are in-
competent and immaterial and not germane to the subject matter of the
suit.
It added that the legislature, in authorizing use of interrogatories, in-
tended to limit the scope of examination on interrogatories to that permitted
by deposition and not to authorize discovery of matters not admissible
in evidence, even though such matters might aid in preparation for trial.
It also said that the contrary federal decisions are not applicable in de-
termining the proper scope of examination on interrogatories in Missouri,
since its code does not authorize the use of interrogatories for the purpose
of such broad discovery as is permitted under federal rules.
PLACE OF CONDUCTING TRILs
Although Section 90 of the code provides that all trials upon the
merits shall be conducted in open court and, so far as convenient, in the
regular court room, it has been held that the facts that the trial of a divorce
case was held in an attorney's office, and that the special judge announced
his decision at said office, the judgment being entered at the court house,
at most were irregularities making the divorce decree voidable, but not mak-
ing it void ab ivitio.29
CONTINUANCES
a. Absent Witnesses
Under Sections 94 and 95, where the defendant's counsel said that he
offered in evidence the statement of an absent witness and that the plaintiff
had agreed to admit the statement, which was signed by the witness but
was not sworn to, and there was no application for a continuance and the
defendant was not forced to go to trial without the absent witness, refusal
of an instruction that testimony of the absent witness as contained in her
statement was entitled to the same weight and credit that the jury would
give the evidence if the witness were personally present in court and testi-
fied to the same thing was not error, for all such instructions are a comment
29. State ex rel. Green v. James, 195 S. W. (2d) 669 (Mo. 1946).
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on the evidence and only to a limited extent have been held proper when
growing out of applications for and avoidances of continuances under the
statute.30
b. Counsel Member of General Assembly
Section 96 of the code relates to the granting of continuances on the
ground that counsel is a member of the general assembly.
Under that section it has been held that where an application for a
continuance was made on grounds that the applicant's attorney was a mem-
ber of the general assembly and that the general assembly was in session
and the Senate journal showed that the Senate was in session during the
time involved, the court could not determine that they were skeleton sessions,
since to do so would impeach records of the general assembly.
Where such an application is presented to the court, the court can only
determine if the application complies with the statute and, if it does, it is
the court's duty to sustain the application, but, if it is insufficient, the court
should deny the application.
Under such circumstances the court does not have authority to hear
evidence to contradict the recital of the application that the attorney's
presence at the trial of the case is necessary to a fair and proper trial, and
to show that the attorney was employed solely for the purpose of obtaining
a continuance.
Where the application for a continuance was made in proper form on
the ground above referred to, but the court denied the application, pro-
hibition was the proper remedy."-
CONSOLIDATION OF SUITS
Section 97 of the code relating to consolidation of actions relates only
to compulsory consolidations and has no bearing on those which are volun-
tary.32
INSTRUCTIONS
Section 105(a) provides for the opportunity of counsel to examine the
instructions offered by opposing parties and to make objections thereto.33
30. Buban v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 193 S. W. (2d) 345 (Mo. App.
1946).
31. State ex rel. Snip v. Thatch, 195 S. W. (2d) 106 (Mo. 1946).
32. Corder v. Morgan Roofing Co., 195 S. W. (2d) 441 (Mo. 1946).
33. State ex rel. State Highway Commission v. Liddle, 193 S. W. (2d) 625
(Mo. App. 1946).
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If a party thinks that an instruction given is wanting in clarity, he
should object to the instruction on that ground at the time it is tendered,
pointing out wherein he regards the instruction as misleading.,"
MOTIoN FOR DIRECTED VERDICT
UNDER SECTION 112 OF THE CODE
In testing the sufficiency of the evidence to make a case for the jury on
the defendant's motion for a directed verdict, the plaintiff's evidence must
be considered true and the plaintiff must be given the benefit of every infer-
ence of fact which can reasonably be drawn therefrom.8
If a plaintiff alleges several grounds of negligence and then instructs on
only one, all others are abandoned; and if the evidence does not support the
ground of negligence submitted, then a general demurrer, at the close of the
case, will raise that issue. But where the plaintiff makes a submissible case
on humanitarian negligence but submits that issue erroneously, he is en-
titled to retry the case and properly submit proven grounds of negligence
and there is no ground for a directed verdict."6
CASES TRIED WITHOUT A JURY
a. Duty of Trial Court to File an Opinion
Under subdivision (b) of Section 114 of the code it is the duty of the
trial court upon request of either party to render a brief opinion containing
a statement of the grounds for its decision.
3 7
b. Sufficiency of Evidence on Appeal
Where a case is tried before a court without a jury the question of the
sufficiency of the evidence to support the judgment may be raised on appeal
whether or not the question was raised in the trial court.
8
This principle also applies on appeal from a judgment of an administra-
tive tribunal.3
34. Coogan v. Nighthawk Freight Service, Inc., 193 S. W. (2d) 388 (Mo. App.
1946). Also see Section 122 of the code in this connection.
35. Lowry v. Mohn, 195 S. W. (2d) 652 (Mo. 1946).
36. White v. Kansas City Public Service Co., 193 S. W. (2d) 60 (Mo. App.
1946).
37. Dye v. School District No. 32 of Pulaski County, 195 S. W. (2d) 874
(Mo. 1946).
38. Helm v. Riss & Co., 194 S. W. (2d) 713 (Mo. App. 1946).
39. Peerless Fixture Co. v. Keitel, 195 S. W. (2d) 449 (Mo. 1946).
(Vol. 11
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c. Duties of Appellate Court
Under subdivision (d) of Section 114, in a case tried upon the facts
without a jury, the appellate court is required to review the case upon
both the law and the evidence as in suits of an equitable nature.
40
The trial court's judgment shall not be set aside unless clearly erron-
eous,41 and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court
to judge of the credibility of the witnesses.42
THE GRANTING Or NEW TRIALS
a. On the Issue of Damages Alone
Under Section 115 of the code, the trial judge has power to grant a
defendant a new trial on the issue of damages alone.43
b. Verdict Against Weight of Evidence
It is also dearly within the discretion of the trial court to grant a
new trial on the ground that the verdict is against the weight of the evi-
dence. And the granting of a new trial on the ground that the verdict is
excessive is equivalent to granting of a new trial on the ground that the
verdict is against the weight of the evidence.4
The granting of a new trial on the ground that the jury's verdict
is inadequate is also equivalent to granting thereof on the ground that the
verdict is against evidence, and the sole question on an appeal from such
40. State ex inf. McKittrick ex rel. Chambers v. Jones, 353 Mo. 900, 185 S. W.
(2d) 17 (1945); Hallayer v. Lackey, 353 Mo. 1244, 188 S. W. (2d) 30 (1945);
A. J. Meyer & Co. v. Schulte, 189 S. W. (2d) 183 (Mo. App. 1945); Davidson &
Eubanks, 189 S. W. (2d) 295 (Mo. 1945); Harlan v. Blume, 190 S. W. (2d) 273
(Mo. App. 1945); Deffry v. American Life & Accident Ins. Co., 193 S. W. (2d)
509 (Mo. App. 1946); A. A. Electric Machinery Co. v. Block, 193 S. W. (2d)
631 (Mo. App. 1946); Gray v. Kansas City, Missouri, 194 S. W. (2d) 207 (Mo.
App. 1946); Wagner v. Mederacke, 195 S. W. (2d) 108 (Mo. App. 1946); Dye v.
School District No. 32 of Pulaski County, 195 S. W. (2d) 874 (Mo. 1946).
41. A. J. Meyer & Co. v. Schulte, 189 S. W. (2d) 183 (Mo. App. 1945);
Johnson v. Frank, 191 S. W. (2d) 618 (Mo. 1946); Dye v. School District No. 32
of Pulaski County, 195 S. W. (2d) 874 (Mo. 1946); Bokata v. Illinois Bankers
Life Insurance Co., 195 S. W. (2d) 888 (Mo. App. 1946).
42. A. J. Meyer & Co. v. Schulte, 189 S. W. (2d) 183 (Mo. App. 1945);
A. A. Electric Machinery Co. v. Block, 193 S. W. (2d) 631 (Mo. App. 1946);
Gray v. Kansas City, Missouri, 194 S. W. (2d) 207 (Mo. App. 1946); Wagner
v. Mederacke, 195 S. W. (2d) 108 (Mo. App. 1946); Dye v. School District No.
32 of Pulaski County, 195 S. W. (2d) 874 (Mo. 1946); Bokata v. Illinois Bankers
Life Insurance Co., 195 S. W. 888 (Mo. App. 1946).
43. Aut v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 194 S. W. (2d) 753 (Mo. App. 1946).
44. Ibid.
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an order is whether there was any substantial evidence to support the order,
in which case the ruling will not be disturbed.
The jury's passion and prejudice may be inferred by the trial court
from an inadequate verdict alone, so that the court's ruling on the question
of such inadequacy as a ground for a new trial is highly discretionary and
the granting of a new trial for such a reason on conflicting evidence is for
the trial court.45
c. Remittiturs
A plaintiff may offer to cut down the amount of damages by voluntarily
filing a remittitur without any order or suggestion by the court. The court
may, therefore, grant a new trial on damages without the prerequisite of
an order for a remittitur.46
In the remittitur practice the court has no power to compel a plaintiff
to file a remittitur either large or small. The court merely suggests a remitti-
tur of a certain amount to be filed by the plaintiff within a specified time as
an alternative to the court's granting defendant a new trial. The decision
as to whether a remittitur will be filed rests exclusively with the plaintiff.
If the plaintiff fails or refuses to file a remittitur, the court then resorts to
the alternative of entering the order for the new trial.47
d. Number of new trials
The trial court has discretion to grant a plaintiff one new trial upon the
ground that the verdict of the jury in favor of the defendant is contrary
to the weight of the evidence.4
e. Stating Grounds for Granting New Trial
In an action for the death of a bicyclist struck by the defendant's auto-
mobile, an order sustaining a plaintiff's motion" for a new trial on the ground
that the verdict for the defendant was against the greater weight of the
evidence is conclusive as to the grounds of the motion, and a statement
in a memorandum accompanying and following the order that the defendant's
testimony as to speed was not supported by the physical facts could not
be used by the defendant as a basis for a claim that the motion was not
sustained because the verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence
45. State ex rel. State Highway Commission v. Liddle, 193 S. W. (2d) 625
(Mo. App. 1946).
46. Aut v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 194 S. W. (2d) 753 (Mo. App. 1946).
47. Ibid.
48. Sawyer v. Winterholder, 195 S. W. (2d) 659 (Mo. 1946).
[Vol. 11
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but rather upon the erroneous assumption that the defendant's evidence
was contrary to the physical facts and therefore unbelievable. 9
MOTION FOR NEw TRIAL
a. Preservation of Allegations of Error
In general, Supreme Court Rule 3.23 requires that allegations of error,
in order to be preserved for appellate review, must be presented to the trial
court in a motion for a new trial. That rule provides further that where
definite objections or requests with specific statement of grounds were made
during the trial in accordance with said Section 122 of the Code, a general
statement in the motion of any allegations of error based thereon is suffi-
cient10
b. Finality of Judgment
According to Supreme Court Rule 3.24 and Section 116 of the code, a
timely motion for a new trial prevents a judgment from becoming final
until the motion is disposed of.51
However, in a proceeding to amend a judgment n unc pro titnc, an
amendment and all orders connected therewith become final at the time
they are made and are not carried over by motion for a new trial.52
A motion for a new trial having been filed, a notice of appeal also
filed on the day a judgment is rendered is premature, as the judgment is
not final since the trial judge might have sustained the motion for a new
trial. Such an appeal should be dismissed.5
When a motion for a new trial is deemed denied under both Section
118 of the code and Supreme Court Rule 3.24, a judgment becomes final
at the expiration of ninety (90) days after the date of filing of the motion
for a new trial, if such motion is not previously passed upon, though the
trial court subsequently overrules the motion, since such action is of no
effect. 4
49. Ibid.
50. State ex rel. State Highway Commission v. Liddle, 193 S. W. (2d) 625
(Mo. App. 1946).
51. Park v. Park, 190 S. W. (2d) 285 (Mo. App. 1945); Lasswell v. Lasswell,
192 S. W. (2d) 207 (Mo. App. 1946); McPike v. St. Louis County Bank, 193
S. W. (2d) 961 (Mo. App. 1946).
52. Lasswell v. Lasswell, supra note 51.
53. Christeson v. Christeson, 190 S. W. (2d) 568 (Mo. App. 1945).
54. McPike v. St. Louis County Bank, 193 S. W. (2d) 961 (Mo. App. 1946).
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Filing of a notice of appeal in the trial court within ten days after
'the overruling of the motion, but more than ten days afer the ninety (90)
day period, is ineffective. 55
The six months period within which an appellate court may, under
Section 130 of the code, permit the filing of a notice of appeal begins to
run at the end of the ninety day period where, up to that time, there has
been no ruling on a motion for a new trial50
An appellate court may not, under Supreme Court Rule 1.15, suspend
or modify Rule 3.24 as far as it relates to the time when a motion for a
new trial is deemed denied, since Rule 3.24 follows Section 118 of the
code and a court can not suspend or modify a statuteY7
NEW TRIAL ORDERED BY COURT ON OWN INITIATIVE
When the time has expired within which a court has authority under
Section 119 of the new code to order a new trial in the cause on its own
motion, it is confined to the grounds therefore assigned by the respondent
in the motion for new trial, except only as provided under Supreme Court
Rule 3.27. It provides that plain errors affecting substantial rights may
be considered on a motion for a new trial or on appeal, in the discretion of
the court, though not raised in the trial court or preserved for review,
or defectively raised or preserved, when the court deems that manifest
injustice or miscarriage of justice has resulted therefrom.,
ExcEPTIoNs TO RULINGS OF A COURT
Section 122 of the code requires exceptions to rulings, where exceptions
are required, to be made at the time of the order or ruling, together with
the grounds therefor. Hence, where no objection was made to the reference
of a case and to the appointment of a referee until the referee commenced
the hearing of testimony, the question of the propriety of the reference was
not preserved for review.59
55. Ibid. Also see Section 129 of the code in connection with this case.
56. Ibid.
57. Ibid.





Missouri Law Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 4 [1946], Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol11/iss4/1
1946] WORK OF MISSOURI SUPREME COURT FOR 1945 431
APPEAL
1. Grounds for Appeal
The right of appeal is purely statutory and to have a judgment re-
viewed on appeal, the party complaining must point out the statute giv-
ing him the right of appeal and conferring jurisdiction. 0
An appeal may not be taken from an order and judgment overruling
a motion for a new trial since the latter is not made an appealable order
by statute. Hence, such an appeal is required to be dismissed.6
Where a judgment dismisses a petition as to one defendant but not
as to the other defendant, an appeal is premature since no final judgment
has been rendered because there is no disposition of the cause of action
as to the defendant not affected by the dismissal.6 2
An order of a circuit court overruling a motion to affirm a judgment
of a justice of the peace is not appealable, for it does not come within any
category of an order or judgment made appealable by Section 126 of the
code.63
2. Duty of Appellant
The right of appeal is statutory and the appellant must at least sub-
stantially conform to the statute in order to have a review of his case.64
Hence, he cannot, after taking an appeal, trust to the clerk of either
the trial or appellate court to remind him of any necessary steps in per-
fecting the appeal.6 5
3. Notice of Appeal
a. Purpose of
The filing of a notice of appeal is a further proceeding in a trial court
with a view of afterwards prosecuting an appeal in the appellate court 6
b. Filing of
Since the right, of appeal is purely statutory, one who undertakes to
60. Randolph v. Supreme Liberty Insurance Co., 195 S. W. (2d) 115 (Mo.
App. 1946).
61. Park v. Park, 190 S. W. (2d) 285 (Mo. App. 1945); Weller v. Hayes
Truck Lines, 192 S. W. (2d) 677 (Mo. App. 1946).
62. Mansfield v. Meade, 194 S. W. (2d) 544 (Mo. App. 1946); S. S. Kresge
Co. v. Shankman, 194 S. W. (2d) 716 (Mo. App. 1946).
63. Randolph v. Supreme Liberty Insurance Co., 195 S. W. (2d) 115 (Mo.
App. 1946).
64. Cartee v. Marler, 192 S. W. (2d) 634 (Mo. App. 1946); Bales v. Jeffer-
son City Lines, 192 S. W. (2d) 27 (Mo. App. 1945).
65. Clader v. City of Neosho, 192 S. W. (2d) 508 (Mo. App. 1946).
66. A. A. Electric Machinery Co. v. Block, 193 S. W. (2d) 631 (Mo. App.
1946).
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avail himself of that right must comply with the statute and file a notice
of appeal within the statutory period.61
Where an appeal was taken more than ten days after a nunc pro tunc
order amending a divorce judgment and denying a wife suit mpney was
made and after expiration of the term of court at which the order was
rendered, an appeal from the order was not timely taken, notwithstanding
the appellant filed an appeal at the same date at which her motion for a
new trial was overruled, since the motion for new trial was not necessary. 8
And an appeal from a judgment quashing an execution taken more than
10 days after its rendition was required to be dismissed as not timely taken,
notwithstanding it was taken on the same day at which the appellant's
motion for a new trial was overruled, since a motion for a new trial was
unnecessary and hence did not prevent the judgment from becoming final
on the day of its rendition."'
c. When proper
While the procedure has been somewhat simplified under the new
code, the purpose and effect of the notice of appeal is essentially the same
as that of the statutory affidavit. It is the step that marks the taking of
the appeal, and under Section 129, filing the notice of appeal makes the
appeal "effective" and gives it "validity," even though the appellant may
fail to take any of the further steps to secure tfie review of the judgment
or order. This presupposes, of course, that the appeal is taken from an
appealable judgment or order as defined and limited by Section 126; and,
when the notice designates an order which is not made appealable, the
appellate court is in precisely the same situation as obtained under the
old code when the affidavit specified an order as to which the right of
appeal did not exist. The court is still without authority to act on appeals
except as they may be permitted by law; and, when the notice of appeal
designates a nonappealable order, there is no alternative, as the law is
written, but to enter an order dismissing the appeal.70
d. Contents
Under Section 131 of the code the notice of appeal is required, among
67. McPike v. St. Louis County Bank, 193 S. W. (2d) 961 (Mo. App. 1946).
68. Lasswell v. Lasswell, 192 S. W. (2d) 207 (Mo. App. 1946).
69. Ibid.
70. Weller v. Hayes Truck Lines, 192 S. NV. (2d) 677 (Mo. App. 1946).
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other things, to "designate the judgment or order appealed from."',
e. Sufficiency
Under Section 131, the sufficiency of the notice of appeal must be
determined by the appellate court. A notice which states the appeal is
"from the order overruling a motion for a new trial and judgment against
the plaintiff entered in this action on the third day of February, 1945,"
is sufficient to show that the appeal was from a final judgment rather than
from an order overruling a motion for a new trial.72
4. Special Order Permitting Delayed Appeals
An appeal being unknown to the common law and purely a statutory
right, the litigant must bring himself within the terms of the statute in
order to avail himself of the right of appeal. In order that there be at
some place an end to litigation, the legislature has wisely provided the
time within which a judgment becomes final and the time within which an
appeal may be taken. It is recognized by Section 130 of the code that
instances may arise whereby the litigant has, without culpable negli-
gence on his part, failed to file a notice of appeal within the ten days'
time allowed by Section 129 and that upon a showing of merit in the
appellant's claim, and that the delay was not due to the appellants culpa-
ble negligence, the proper appellate court may allow the notice of appeal
to be filed, but such authority in the appellate court is expressly limited to
"within 6 months from the date of such final judgment."7 3
So a motion requesting a special order of a court of appeals permitting
an appeal from a final judgment quashing an execution filed more than
six months after the date of final judgment, is filed too late and is required
to be overruled. 74
a. Necessity of; filing
Under Section 135 of the code, an appeal is not perfected in the ab-
sence of a transcript of the record transmitted to the appellate court by
the clerk of the trial court under his hand and the seal of the court, or, if
a bill of exceptions is intended as a transcript, in the absence of an authen-
tication by the clerk or a timely filing.75
71. Ibid.
72. Park v. Park, 190 S. W. (2d) 285 (Mo. App. 1945).
73. McPike v. St. Louis County Bank, 193 S. W. (2d) 962 (Mo. App. 1946).
74. Lasswell v. Lasswell, 192 S. W. (2d) 207 (Mo. App. 1946).
75. Cartee v. Marler, 192 S. W. (2d) 634 (Mo. App. 1946).
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Where the record disclosed that a copy of the transcript on appeal
was lodged with the clerk of the circuit court, whether such copy remained
on file or was served on the respondent was a matter of proof and the appeal
would not be dismissed on motion on the ground of the appellant's alleged
failure to allow a copy of the transcript to remain in the office of the cir-
cuit clerk.76
The duty of the appellant to see that the transcript is filed in the
appellate court within ninety (90) days from the filing of the notice of
appeal, or the further time given to file it, is considered fully by the supreme
court in Clader v. City of Neosho which is discussed earlier under "Ex-
tending the Time for Doing Specified Acts."
The purpose of Rules 1.30 and 3.26 of the supreme court pertaining
to the enlargement of time to perfect an appeal is to expedite appeals by
preventing them from lying dormant in the trial court and to let the
appellate court know what cases in which notices of appeal have been
filed are live cases in which appellant actually intends to perfect his
appeal.77
Under Supreme Court Rule 1.04 (c), failure of an appellant to serve
a typewritten copy of the transcript on the respondent is not ground for
dismissal of appeal, since a typewriten transcript is only required to be
served if the appellant does not print the transcript on appeal.78
The statutory requirement that the appellant shall file with the clerk
of the trial court a copy of the transcript of the record, which copy shall
remain on file in the office of the clerk, does not mean that the clerk can-
not allow an attorney in the case to take the transcript out for temporary
use upon giving his receipt, since the copy filed is intended for use by




The bill of exceptions, as formerly termed, has been abolished and
only a transcript on appeal, which contains matters formerly shown by
a bill of exceptions, is now required. If the appellant has inserted matters
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not required in a transcript on appeal, this may be of interest in a proper
court on a question of costs, if that question is raised; but an appellant
should not be deprived of his appeal simply because he has improperly
called his transcript on appeal a "Bill of Exceptions," and has inserted
matters therein not necessary on an appeal.8 0
2. Sufficiency of in Particular Instances
Where a cause was presented on appeal upon the pleadings, judgment,
motion for new trial, order sustaining motion, and certain exhibits, and
no evidence was included in the record and a new trial was granted on
the ground that the court erred in not applying the equitable rule which
shifted the burden of proof to the defendant-appellant to show that the
transfer of property of the plaintiff's mother to the defendant, who was
her agent and who participated in the transfer by taking the acknowedg-
ment of the transferor, was fair and equitable, the abstract of the record
did not comply with Sections 135 or 136 of the code or with Rules 1.04
and 1.06 of the supreme court. Apparently this was so because of lack
of enough of a record, including evidence, to determine whether the court
should have applied the equitable rule."1
3. Abbreviation of
There can be no abbreviated form of transcript on appeal without
both parties agreeing to it. Unless there is such an agreement, Section
135(a) of the code makes it mandatory for a full transcript of the record
to be used. Supreme Court Rule 1.04(a) specifies what must be included
in such full transcript of the record. Its sufficiencsy "for a determination
of all questions presented to the court for decision," if questioned by the
adverse party, is for the appellate court alone. The trial court cannot
decide this question. Likewise, assessment of costs for requiring unneces-
sary matter is for the appellate court. In fact, the trial court has no func-
tion to perform with reference to such a full transcript (not even to allow
it, to order it filed, or to certify it) except when one of the parties con-
tests its truth and claims that some part of it is incorrect. In that event,
the trial judge must settle the contested matter and his finding on the
contested portion takes the place of the parties' agreement to its correct-
ness. He must settle such a controversy because bystanders' bills in civil
80. Kyger v. Koeper, 194 S. W. (2d) 51 (Mo. App. 1946).
S1. Nelson v. Hammett, 189 S. W. (2d) 238 (Mo. 1945).
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cases are abolished. If a transcript, prepared in accordance with Section
135, is "agreed to by the parties" as a correct transcript, it is only neces-
sary that "the clerk of the trial court under his hand and the seal of the
court, shall transmit said (original) transcript" to the appellate court.
There are only two kinds of abbreviated transcripts provided for
by the code, and neither of them is authorized without a signed written
agreement. Section 135(a) provides that the parties or their attorneys
"may agree in writing upon an abbreviated or partial transcript of the
evidence, either in narrative form, or in question and answer form." This
provision concerns only abbreviation of the evidence to be included in the
transcript of the record. The trial judge has no function to perform with
regard to this form of transcript. Section 136 authorizes a much shorter
abbreviation than does Section 135(a), not only of the evidence, but of
the whole record. It authorizes the parties to "prepare and sign a state-
ment of the case showing how the questions arose and were decided in
the trial court and setting forth only so many of the facts averred and
proved or sought to be proved as are essential to a decision of the questions
by the appellate court." It also requires this statement to "include a copy
of the judgment or order appealed from, a copy of the notice of appeal
with its filing date, and a concise statement of the points to be relied on
by the appellant." The trial judge may require such additions to the
statement "as the court may consider necessary fully to present the ques-
tions raised by the appeal." The requirement for approval of the trial court,
with the right for the judge to make additions thereto, is to prevent a moot
case from being brought to the appellate court. Thus, the function of
the trial judge under Section 136 is to determine the truth and sufficiency
of such an agreed statement after (but not before) the parties have agreed
to use it. He can refuse to approve it or he can perfect it by making addi-
tions to it, but he cannot agree for any party that such a statement must
be used, when such party insists on a full transcript.
Supreme Court Rule 1.06 merely provides a way to get an agreed
statement authorized by Section 136 (when only legal questions with
respect to instructions are to be raised), but it clearly requires the use
of the full transcript of the evidence if the adverse party so desires. By
refusing to agree to such an abbreviated transcript (and requiring a full
transcript), such a party, under Rule 1.20 takes the chance of being required
to pay to the appellant his cost of supplying the evidence therein, if the
[Vol. 11
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appellate court decides that the evidence was unnecessary for the deter-
mination of the questions raised. However, the code and our rules give
parties the right to make their own choice and the trial judge has no right
to make it for them.8
2
6. Withdrawal of Appeal
Under Supreme Court Rule 1.17 any appellant can withdraw his
appeal in the trial court any time prior to the filing of the transcript on
appeal in the appellate court, and the appellant may dismiss his appeal
in the appellate court after the filing of the transcript and prior to the
submission of the case. The appeal is not perfected until the transcript
is filed in the appellate court.88
7. Matters Considered on Appeal
Section 140(a) of the code provides that, except as to questions of
jurisdiction of the trial court over the subject matter and questions as
to sufficiency of the pleadings to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted, or a legal defense to a claim, no allegations of error shall be con-
sidered in any civil appeal except such as have been presented to or ex-
pressly decided by the trial court.84 Hence under that section and Supreme
Court Rule 3.23, objections to jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal,
or that a complaint does not state a cause of action, or to the sufficiency
of the evidence to support the determination, may be raised for the first
time on appeal regardless of prior exceptions or motions.8 5
But an appellate court may refuse to dispose of a case on the technical
consideration that there is a failure of the appellant to make the precise
point governing the case in his brief. "
Further, on appeal it is too late to complain for the first time that
the plaintiff failed to plead facts of which there was evidence, for the
pleadings will be considered amended to conform to the facts admitted
without objection. 7 It is also too late to complain that the respondent
82. State ex rel. National Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Seehorn, 188 S. W.
(2d) 657 (Mo. 1945).
83. A. A. Electric Machinery Co. v. Block, 193 S. W. (2d) 631 (Mo. App.
1946).
84. State ex rel. State Highway Commission v. Liddle, 193 S. W. (2d) 625
(Mo. App. 1946).
85. Peerless Fixture Co. v. Keitel, 195 S. W. (2d) 449 (Mo. 1946).
86. In re Duren, 195 S. W. (2d) 745 (Mo. 1946).
87." Hallauer v. Lackey, 353 Mo. 1244, 188 S. W. (2d) 30 (1945).
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pleaded conclusions,"8 or that there was a misjoinder of causes of action
in one count of the petition, for such a fault is waived where the petition
is not attacked by demurrer, motion, or answer.80
8. Judgment on Appeal
a. Errors not affecting merits of the action
Section 140(b) of the code provides that an appellate court should
not reverse a judgment, unless it believes that error was committed by the
trial court which materially affected the merits of the action.
There have been several cases to which this section has been applied.
Thus, it has been held that the introduction of improper evidence,00 the
giving of improper instructions, 91 the refusal to give an instruction,2 and
a technical error in the verdict did not require the reversal of judgments. 0
b. Should give judgment deemed proper
An appellate court, on an appeal from an order granting a new trial
upon the plaintiff's refusal to enter a remittitur as ordered by the trial
court, has authority to review the question and may sustain, modify, or
reverse the action in the trial court with directions to enter such judgment
as it is of the opinion ought to be entered."-
But, where the court lacks the evidence on which to base a proper
finding, the judgrerpt should be reversed and the cause remanded to the
trial court for a new trial.95
Where the only error found in the proceedings in the trial court was
such as affected the amount of damages, the judgment was reversed and
the cause was remanded for a new trial, in accordance with the views ex-
pressed on the issue of the amount of damages only.90
88. Ibid.
89. Helm v. Riss & Co., 194 S. W. (2d) 713 (Mo. App. 1946).
90. In re Harlow's Estate, 192 S. W. (2d) 5 (Mo. App. 1945).
91. Davis v. Burke, 188 S. W. (2d) 765 (Mo. App. 1945).
92. Utterback v. New York Life Insurance Co., 191 S. W. (2d) 421 (Mo.
App. 1945).
93. Humphries v. Shipp, 194 S. W. (2d) 693 (Mo. App. 1946).
94. Dodd v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad Co., 193 S. W. (2d) 905 (Mo.
1946).
95. In re Mansour's Estate, 185 S. W. (2d) 360 (Mo. App. 1945). See, to the
same effect, Gardner v. Switzer, 186 S. W. (2d) 561 (Mo. 1945) where available
witnesses who knew the facts had not been called.
96: Franklin v. Kansas City Public Service Co., 186 S. W. (2d) 546 (Mo.
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c. Awarding of damages on affirmance or dismissal
The application of Section 140(d) of the code authorizing an assess-
ment of damages by the appellate court on affirmance or dismissal is in
the nature of a penalty for vexatious delay. 7
Where the burden of the assessment of damages of the executor's appeal,
allegedly taken to delay satisfaction of the judgment, would be borne by
the estate and not by the executor or his attorney, a motion for assessment
of such damages was overruled.98
d. Opinions to be Written
The opinion of the court of appeals, upon sustaining a motion to
dismiss an appeal, should, under Section 141(a) of the code, be reduced
to writing and filed in the cause.99
Production of Documentary Evidence
Taking of Deposition
Section 142 of the code authorizing the trial court to compel the pro-
duction of documents at the taking of a deposition must be read in con-
necion with Section 86 relating to the production of books and papers and
requiring that documents to be produced contain evidence material to
any matter involved in the action.0
97. In re Thomasson's Estate, 192 S. W. (2d) 867 (Mo. 1946).
98. Ibid.
99. McPike v. St. Louis County Bank, 193 S. W. (2d) 961 (Mo .App. 1946).
100. State ex rel. Thompson v. Harris, 195 S. W. (2d) 645 (Mo. 1946). '
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